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In 1914, James Leuba surveyed the eminent psychologists of the United States 
with regard to their belief in God and immortality (Leuba, 1916).  In 1933, he replicated 
the survey (Leuba, 1934).  His results affirmed, he stated, "that, in general, the greater the 
ability of the psychologist as a psychologist [sic], the more difficult it become [sic] for 
him to believe in the continuation of individual life after bodily death" (1921a, p. 279).  
He concluded that eminent behavioral scientists were least likely of all scientists to 
believe, and that psychological learning made belief in an "interventionist God... almost 
impossible" (1934, p. 294).  He further stated, "If knowledge is, as it seems, a cause of 
the decline of the traditional beliefs, that decline will presumably continue as long as the 
increase in knowledge" (1934, p. 300).  In 1958, Mayer (1959) replicated Leuba's survey.   
 
 vii 
The results of the initial survey and the two replications of the survey were 
consistent with Leuba's hypotheses.  However, no one had replicated that survey of 
eminent psychology scholars in almost fifty years (from 1958-2006)—until now.   
 The current study replicated Leuba’s original survey, as well as collecting 
additional qualitative data via questionnaires and interviews.  The response rate was over 
61%.  Not one of the respondents expressed a belief in immortality, and only one person 
expressed a belief in God—and then only with this caveat: “when desperate.” As a matter 
of fact, of all the groups that have been surveyed using this questionnaire during the last 
93 years, this is the first time that 0% of the respondents in a group expressed a belief in 
immortality. 
 Only very few of the respondents indicated they engaged in activities that could 
be deemed in some way religious, spiritual, or contemplative. 
 Suggested further research would question whether or not substantial nonverbal 
differences exist between religious people and scientists.  Also, although psychology 
rests on the presumption that the individual human being exists, this study’s respondents 
found defining the individual to be a complex or impossible task.   
 
 viii 
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CHAPTER 1:  INTRODUCTION 
 
Introduction 
 In 1914, James Leuba surveyed the eminent psychologists of the United States 
with regard to their belief in God and immortality (Leuba, 1916).  In 1933, he replicated 
the survey (Leuba, 1934).  His results affirmed, he stated, "that, in general, the greater the 
ability of the psychologist as a psychologist, the more difficult it become [sic] for him to 
believe in the continuation of individual life after bodily death" (1916, p. 279).  He 
concluded that eminent behavioral scientists were least likely of all scientists to believe, 
and that psychological learning made belief in an "interventionist God... almost 
impossible" (1934, p. 294).  He further stated, "If knowledge is, as it seems, a cause of 
the decline of the traditional beliefs, that decline will presumably continue as long as the 
increase in knowledge" (1934, p. 300).  In 1958, Mayer (1959) replicated Leuba's survey.   
 
Statement of the Problem 
 The results of the initial survey and the two replications of the survey were 
consistent with Leuba's hypotheses.  However, no one had replicated that survey of 
eminent psychology scholars in almost fifty years before this study.  How could we have 
known whether or not the trend that Leuba predicted had continued unless empirical data 






Purpose of the Study 
 The purpose of this study was to determine the extent to which eminent 
psychology scholars in the United States believed in God and immortality, and to gauge 
whether or not the proportion of such beliefs had decreased during the last ninety-three 
years, as Leuba predicted.  More precisely, the purpose of this study was to replicate, as 
nearly as possible, a survey administered twice by Leuba and also administered decades 
later by Mayer.  As Johnson and Christensen stated, “To be an effective consumer of 
research, you should not and must not consider the results of any one study to be 
conclusive.  You need to look across studies to see whether the findings are repeatedly 
confirmed or replicated” (2004, p. 86). 
Thus, this study included descriptive research.  It was descriptive in that it used a 
questionnaire and interviews to gather data from the population being studied.  I mailed 
the questionnaire to each individual respondent via the United States Postal Service mail 
system.  The respondents replied to the survey and mailed it back to me.  The respondents 
who were willing to be interviewed, were interviewed by me.  Then, those data were 
organized and presented systematically so as to provide factual and accurate information 
about the population to the appropriate discourse community. 
 
Research Questions 
1.  To what extent do eminent psychology scholars believe in God? 
2.  To what extent do eminent psychology scholars believe in immortality? 
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3.  Has the percentage of the eminent psychology scholars who believe in God changed 
since 1914? 
4.  Has the percentage of the eminent psychology scholars who believe in immortality 
changed since 1914? 
5.  What are the characteristics of the spiritual and religious beliefs of eminent 
psychology scholars? 
 
Definitions of Terms 
NAS – Refers to the National Academy of Sciences. 
APA – Refers to the American Psychological Association. 
First Leuba Study - The survey conducted in 1914, as reported by Leuba in 1916.   
Although the study included surveys of several distinct populations, only the part that 
distinctly included eminent psychology scholars will be referred to herein.   Thus, in the 
current study, unless stated otherwise, when the First Leuba Study is cited, it will refer to 
only that part of Leuba’s 1916 study that included eminent psychology scholars.  (See 
Appendix A for the questionnaire) Also, various differences between the first (1916) and 
second (1921a) editions of Leuba’s The Belief in God and Immortality are not 
insubstantial, so any reference to the First Leuba Study herein relies on the first edition 
(1916) unless the second edition (1921a) is specified. 
Second Leuba Study - The survey conducted in 1933, as reported by Leuba in 1934. 
Although the study included surveys of several distinct populations, only the part that 
distinctly included eminent psychology scholars will be referred to herein.   Thus, in the 
 
 4 
current study, unless stated otherwise, when the Second Leuba Study is cited, it will refer 
to only that part of Leuba’s 1934 study that included eminent psychology scholars. 
Mayer Study - The survey conducted in 1958, as reported by Mayer in 1959.   Although 
Mayer’s study included surveys of several distinct populations, only the part that 
distinctly included eminent psychology scholars will be referred to herein.   Thus, in the 
current study, unless stated otherwise, when the Mayer Study is cited, it will refer to only 
that part of Mayer’s study that included eminent psychology scholars. (See Appendix B 
for the questionnaire) 
First Larson Study - The survey conducted in 1996, as reported by Larson and Witham in 
1997.  This survey included no eminent psychologists. 
Second Larson Study - The survey conducted in 1998, as reported by Larson and Witham 
in 1998.   This survey included no eminent psychologists. 
Eminent Psychologists – Represented in the various literature primarily as “eminent 
psychologists,” “greater psychologists,” “psychologists of greater distinction,” or 
“eminent psychology scholars.”    
The First Leuba Study divided respondents into two groups: those of "lesser 
distinction" and those of "greater distinction" (pp.247-248).   The "greater" psychologists 
included approximately 26% of the members of the American Psychological Association 
(APA) who were identified by people who were "competent" to select the "greater" 
psychologists from the APA membership list (Leuba, 1916, pp. 259, 266).   
 In the Second Leuba Study, it was stated that the "group of the Greater 
Psychologists was made up of the 50 starred names added since 1906 to the psychologists 
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already starred in the edition of the American Men of Science of that date" (1934, p. 296).   
In the earlier editions of American Men of Science, a star next to a name indicated that the 
person was a more distinguished scientist.  Thus, Leuba's eminent psychologists in the 
1933 survey were comprised of the "starred" psychologists in the 1933 edition of the 
American Men of Science who were not listed as "starred" names in the 1906 edition. 
 The Mayer Study designated as "eminent psychologists" all twenty-three of the 
psychologists who were listed as members of the NAS in the 1957 Proceedings of the 
National Academy of Sciences (pp. 649-680).    It also identified as "eminent behavioral 
scientists" both the twenty-three NAS psychologists and the twelve NAS anthropologists 
(for a total of thirty-five members).   
Likewise, the survey I administered designated the psychologists who were 
currently members of the NAS to be eminent psychology scholars. 
Belief in God – As described in the First Leuba Study, respondents were asked whether 
they believed "in a God to whom one may pray in the expectation of receiving an answer.  
By 'answer,' I mean more than the subjective psychological effect of prayer." 
Belief in immortality – As described in the First Leuba Study, respondents were asked if 
they believed in conditional or unconditional continuation of the person after death in 
another world. 
01AA, 02AB, etc. – The survey respondents are generally referred to herein as “01AA” 
rather than “respondent 01AA.”  The respondents’ identities go in numerical-alphabetical 
order from 01AA to 62CJ.  Furthermore, the pronoun “he” or “him” is used when 
referring to any of the respondents regardless of their actual gender or sex. 
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Ellipses in interviews – In the interviews (Appendices N-T), an ellipsis without brackets 
indicates a lapse of time or a pause in speech.  An ellipsis within brackets indicates either 
one word or a few words were deleted—unless there is an extra period within the 
brackets, in which case at least one sentence was deleted.  These deletions are few; they 
serve the purpose of ensuring anonymity or confidentiality for the respondents.  
 
Assumptions 
 I assumed that the participants would be honest as they answered the survey 
questions.  I also assumed that the psychology scholars who were members of the 




 Even the most candid survey respondents may have been betrayed by their failing 
or distorted memories: 
Other than Wilder Penfield’s work, there is no research to suggest that 
memory works like a video recorder, capturing every part of an experience 
exactly as it happens.  Normally, what a person recalls is not an exact 
replication of an event, according to Elizabeth Loftus, a leading memory 
researcher.  Rather, a memory is a reconstruction—an account pieced 
together from a few highlights, using information that may or may not be 
accurate (Loftus & Loftus, 1980).  Put another way, ‘memory is not so 
much like reading a book as it is like writing one from fragmentary notes’ 
(Kihlstrom, 1995, p.341).  Ample evidence indicates that memory is quite 
often inaccurate.  ‘Critical details of an experience can be forgotten or 
become distorted, their source and order may be misremembered, and 
under certain circumstances completely new details may be incorporated 
into a memory’ (Conway et al., 1996, p. 69).  Recall is, even for people 
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with the most accurate memories, partly truth and partly fiction. (Wood, 
Wood, & Boyd, 2004, pp. 204-205) 
 
 Most fundamentally, this study did not subject the hypotheses to “grave risk of 
refutation modus tollens, but only to a rather feeble danger” (Meehl, 1978, p. 821).  This 
is not unusual in psychological experiments, and it happens mainly because  
the null hypothesis is, taken literally, always false.... A little reflection 
shows us why it has to be the case, since an output variable such as adult 
IQ, or academic achievement, or effectiveness at communication, or 
whatever, will always, in the social sciences, be a function of a sizable but 
finite number of factors.... In order for two groups to be exactly equal on 
such an output variable, we have to imagine that they are exactly equal or 
delicately counterbalanced on all of the contributors in the causal 
equation, which will never be the case.... If you have enough cases and 
your measures are not totally unreliable, the null hypothesis will always be 
falsified, regardless of the truth of the substantive theory. (Meehl, p.822)  
 
"The field of psychology is not of a single mind on a number of issues surrounding the 
conduct and reporting of what is commonly known as null hypothesis significance 
testing” (American Psychological Association, 2001, p. 21).  Furthermore, many 
researchers cannot agree on how to do power analyses, or even the proper identification 
of which hypotheses are the research hypotheses and which are the null hypotheses 
( Cohen, 1990).  
Thus, working within these inevitable constraints, I have drawn conclusions that 
are typical in social science today.  The operational, statistical measurements will allow 






Justification and Significance of the Study 
 This study was significant because “the university is the conscience of the culture, 
the most important institution in Western culture” (Dugger, 1974).  Its psychology faculty 
members’ attitudes about supernatural and eschatological matters are important and 
relevant.  The study also contributed to the knowledge about psychology scholars' 
attitudes that is available to academic administrators, government officials, and faculty 
members.   
 The primary justification for this research was that it was interesting.  I 
encountered no one who expressed that they were not interested in the matter.  On the 
contrary, many people expressed strong opinions related to the topic.  Furthermore, the 
community of psychology researchers is interested in the topic, as was demonstrated by a 
recent Observer (American Psychological Society periodical publication) that was 
devoted to the theme of the relationship between religion and psychology (Bloom, 2005; 
Kagan & Snidman, 2005; Leshner, 2005; Myers, 2005; Sokol, 2005; Stocker, 2005); a 
substantial part of a recent edition of Academe: The Bulletin of the American Association 
of University Professors was devoted to the topic of religion in higher education (Krebs, 
2006; Hill, 2006; Wagner, 2006; Hardy, 2006; Keshavarz, 2006; Olszewski, 2006); and 
the topic has been discussed in many recent editions of the Chronicle of Higher 
Education (e.g., Appleyard, 2006; Chaszar, 2006; Martin, 2006).   
 Leuba justified his studies by saying, "Curiosity as to the beliefs of scientific men 
is justified, for they enjoy great influence in the modern world, even in matters religious" 
(1934, p. 291). 
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 Mayer stated it thusly: 
 The role of the scientist at Mid-Twentieth Century is one of 
unequalled prestige in the eyes of the general Public.  The position of 
leadership in technological advancement which he enjoys raises certain 
questions concerning the nature of his attitudes and beliefs, especially in 
areas of considerable concern to the lay person.  Do scientists believe in 
God?  In immortality?  Do they desire immortality?  Are their religious 
beliefs different from the general population?  If scientists are different, 
when does this differentiation begin—in college, in graduate school?  Or 
is there a selective factor contributing to both scientific interest and 
religious attitude? Does their assumption about a strictly determined 
universe preclude belief in a being who transcends and manipulates 
natural phenomena?  Can a scientist be eminent and maintain traditional 
religious concepts? (Mayer, 1959, p.1) 
 
 Larson and Witham conceded these points and followed up with their partial 
replications. The first and second Larson studies were the most recent partial replications 
of the first Leuba study.  According to Larson and Witham,  
 Eighty years ago, Leuba wrote that scientific knowledge would 
demand ‘a revision of public opinion regarding the prevalence and future 
of the two cardinal beliefs of official Christianity.’  He asserted: ‘The 
essential problem facing organized Christianity is constituted by the 
widespread rejection of its two fundamental dogmas.’  Though a noted 
psychologist, Leuba misjudged either the human mind or the ability of 
science to satisfy all human needs.  Such is the risk of making historical 
predictions. 
  
Although the previous statements about justification and significance are 
important, perhaps the most compelling is this:  When Larson and Witham investigated 
the religious beliefs of eminent scientists in 1998, they concluded that biologists had the 
lowest rates of belief in God and immortality.  The problem is that their study—unlike all 
the previously published uses of that identical questionnaire with eminent U.S. scientists 
(Leuba, 1916; Leuba 1934; Mayer, 1959)—did not include psychologists in its sample.  
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This matters because the previous surveys consistently found that psychologists, not 
biologists, were the scientists who were least likely to express belief in God or 
immortality.  Why would Larson and Witham not have included psychologists in their 
replication?  That’s like doing a survey on jolly-ness and not including Santa Claus—
especially if he had been included in all the previous surveys. The potentially misleading 
information provided by Larson and Witham has since propagated out to other influential 
publications (e.g., Richards, 2007; “Does neuroscience threaten human values?” 1998).  
Thus, it would be useful to generate data that would support or refute the theories of 
Leuba, Mayer, or Larson and Witham, by replicating the study and including eminent 
psychology scholars as the respondents. 
 The manner of using the questionnaire and interviews for the study was justified.  
All of the people who have used Leuba's questionnaire have been academics of great 
distinction. Leuba's questionnaire has been used both by psychologists and by academics 
outside of the psychological community.  The same questionnaire has been used by 
researchers of widely  differing theological backgrounds.  For example, Leuba professed 
himself to be an atheistic scientist, but Larson and Witham were both church members 
who have received funding from conservative organizations that support the idea of the 
importance of God.  
 
Summary 
 This chapter provided an overview and introduction to the study, a statement of 
the problem, the purpose of the study, the research questions, the null hypotheses, the 
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alternative hypotheses, the definitions of terms, assumptions, research limitations, and the 
significance of the study.  The second chapter will provide a review of relevant literature. 
 
 12 
CHAPTER 2:  REVIEW OF RELATED LITERATURE 
The First Leuba Study 
 James Leuba was “one of the pioneers in psychology.... The psychology 
laboratory which he founded at Bryn Mawr [College] shortly after his appointment there 
in 1898 and from which he published some studies of perception was one of the first 
dozen in the country” (McBride, 1947, p. 645).   
 In 1914, amidst publishing a number of notable books and articles about the 
psychology of religion (Leuba, 1912, 1913, 1915, 1917b, 1921b, 1925, 1933), he mailed 
the questionnaire for the First Leuba Study (Leuba, 1916).  The questionnaire, which 
inquired about the status of the respondent’s belief in God, belief in immortality, and 
desire for immortality (see Appendix A) was mailed to 1,504 scholars in the United 
States.  The respondents included historians, sociologists, biologists, physicists, 
psychologists, and mathematicians.  The physicists, biologists, astronomers, and 
mathematicians were randomly selected from the names listed in the second edition of 
the American Men of Science (Cattell, 1910).  The historians were randomly selected 
from the membership list of the American Historical Association (Leuba, 1916, pp. 258-
259), the sociologists were randomly selected from the membership list of the American 
Sociological Society (Leuba, 1916, pp. 262-263), and the psychologists were randomly 
selected from the membership list of the American Psychological Association (Leuba, 
1916, pp. 266-267).   
For each of these groups of scholars, Leuba distinguished between the “lesser” 
members and the “greater” members.  For example, the mathematicians, biologists, 
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astronomers, and physicists of “greater eminence” were designated as such because the 
American Men of Science had a star or an asterisk next to the names that the directory’s 
editor, James McKeen Cattell, had designated as being of greatest distinction in their 
fields.  Cattell had received assistance from  
twelve of the most distinguished men in each science.  From these men, 
Dr. Cattell asked and received, for each science, twelve lists containing a 
definite number of names arranged in the order of their distinction, 
according to the opinion of the makers of the lists.  From the twelve lists 
in each science, Dr. Cattell compiled, according to a method described in 
an Appendix to American Men of Science, the lists of names starred in 
that volume. (Leuba, 1916, p. 249) 
 
Likewise, the names of “greater” psychology, sociology, and history scholars were 
compiled from lists that had been “prepared by competent persons” (Leuba, 1916, p. 
259).  Leuba did not elaborate on this method of selection.  Of the physicists, biologists, 
astronomers, and mathematicians, approximately 1 out of every 5.5 were designated as 
greater; of the historians, approximately 1 out of every 3.7 were greater; and of the 
psychologists, approximately 1 out of every 3.8 were greater.  Of the sociologists, a 
similar number were designated as greater; however, the group was divided into three 
subgroups instead of two. 
 Of the 288 names on the membership list of the American Psychological 
Association in 1914, Leuba (1916) 
eliminated the names of all those who do not teach psychology (making an 
exception, however, in favor of those engaged in scientific psychological 
research), those teaching in Roman Catholic institutions and exclusively in 
medical schools, and those who are decidedly educators or philosophers 
rather than psychologists....  In a list thus reduced to about two-thirds of its 
original length, fifty names were singled out as those of the more 
distinguished psychologists; and marking the remaining names according 




Leuba noted that he excluded the medical school teachers because they usually tended to 
be “physiologists rather than psychologists” (p. 266). 
 Leuba stated that he sent a second request to addressees who did not respond to 
the first request to fill out and return the questionnaire.  There is no evidence, however, 
that he sent more than two requests to each addressee.  More than 75% of the addressees 
filled out their questionnaires and returned them, some of the respondents having written 
unsolicited comments on the questionnaires.  Almost 10% did not return the 
questionnaire at all;  Leuba assumed that “an indeterminable number may be put down as 
dead, or critically ill, or absent.  The failure of these to answer may be considered as not 
affecting the statistics, since there is no reason to think that the dead, the critically ill, and 
the absent belong entirely or predominantly to a particular class of believers” (pp. 226-
227). 
   Of the 14.7% whose questionnaires were returned blank, 22 of them were 
reported as dead, 26 as not found, away, or ill, and “a large number” of the unanswered 
questionnaires were returned with remarks that the questionnaire was too personal or 
private, or that the respondent did not know how to respond to the questions (p. 227). 
 For the subgroup of psychologists, the percentage of questionnaires not returned 
was much smaller than for the other groups.  Only four of the psychologists did not return 
the questionnaire.  Of those who returned the questionnaires, eight of the greater left them 
blank, and four of the lesser left them blank.  (Two of these explained, at length, why 
they were reluctant to answer the questionnaires.  For example, one of them wrote, in 
part, “I am not sure that I can completely or accurately account for this reluctance.  Very 
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likely I cannot account for it.  I regret it none the less, for I would gladly coöperate [sic] 
with you in your investigation; but I seem to be profoundly inhibited for some reason, or 
lack of reason” (Leuba, 1916, p. 232).) 
 The results showed that the psychology scholars were generally less likely than 
any of the other scholars to express belief in God, belief in immortality, or desire for 
immortality.  Of the respondents in the subgroup of all psychologists, 24.2% indicated 
that they believed in God.  Therefore, more than 75% were agnostic, doubters, or 
disbelievers.  13.2% of the greater psychologists expressed belief in God, and 32.1% of 
the lesser psychologists expressed belief in God.  On the question of belief in 
immortality, 19.8% of the total psychology subgroup expressed belief (8.8% of the 
greater, 26.9% of the lesser).  All of the believers in immortality expressed a desire for 
immortality; 34.7% of the non-believers in immortality expressed a desire for 
immortality; 47.2% of all of the psychology subgroup respondents expressed that they 
did not desire immortality (p. 267).  Some of the respondents also included extra 
comments in the margins.  One respondent replaced the word “belief” with the word 
“hope” (p. 268).  Also, the subgroup of psychologists was the only one in which the 
percentage of believers in immortality (19.8%) was less than the percentage of believers 
in God (24.2%) (Ogburn, 1917). 
 The more striking facts discovered are that, regarding the number 
of believers, the classes [subgroups] arrange themselves in the following 
descending order, historians, physical scientists, biological scientists, 
sociologists, and psychologists; that in each class the more distinguished 
group counts a much smaller number of believers than the less 
distinguished; and that there is a much larger number of believers among 
the women than among the men (82 percent against 56 percent). (Leuba, 




 Leuba further noted the following: 
In three of these groups (biologists, historians, and psychologists) the 
number of believers among the men of greater distinction is only half, or 
less than half the number of believers among the less distinguished men.  I 
do not see any way to avoid the conclusion that disbelief in a personal God 
and in personal immortality is directly proportional to abilities making for 
success in the sciences in question. (Leuba, 1916, p. 279) 
  
 Contemporary scholars’ reactions to the First Leuba Study ranged from approval 
to disapproval.  For example, Wright (1917a, p. 402) stated, “The questionnaires were 
carried on with great care and thoroughness, and this portion of the book deserves the 
study of all interested in possible methods for the investigation of the prevalence of 
beliefs in contemporary society.”  Kantor (1917b), however,  
completely failed to realize how Professor Leuba could set himself such a 
meaningless task involving so unscientific a methodology.... There is 
absolutely no clue as to why the physicist should be more liable to believe 
in the type of God that Professor Leuba indicates than any other type of 
presumably informed person.  It is easy to see that Professor Leuba wants 
his concepts to be so defined as to fall below the critical horizon of any 
informed individual.  On this basis his results might be formally true, but 
entirely irrelevant.  The entire statistical study then, in its emphasis of a 
primitive concept with the intellectual criterion of rejection, illustrates an 
attempt to break logic with the usual disastrous consequences. (p. 114) 
 
Also, Ogburn (1917) found, with regard to the First Leuba Study, “It was impossible to 
test by certain statistical methods some of his conclusions because unfortunately exact 
numbers are not given.  It is decidedly to be regretted that full tables were not given.... In 





The Second Leuba Study 
 In 1933, Leuba mailed out virtually the same survey that he had used in the First 
Leuba Study (Leuba, 1934).  The investigation made in 1933 was carried out in the same 
way as that of 1914 (Leuba, 1934, p. 297).  Again, the 1933 edition of American Men of 
Science was used as a source of addressees.  The statements submitted to the addressees 
were identical.  However, historians and mathematicians were not included in this survey; 
only biologists, physicists, sociologists, and psychologists were included in the 1933 
survey.  Leuba did retain the practice of distinguishing between lesser and greater 
scholars.   
 The psychology scholars were selected from the 1933 Year Book of the American 
Psychological Association.  114 names were randomly selected from among the active 
members who taught psychology or engaged in research.  In addition to those lesser 
scholars, the group of greater psychologists was “made up of the 50 starred names added 
since 1906 to the psychologists already starred in the edition of American Men of Science 
of that date” (Leuba, 1934, p. 296). 
 Leuba received at least 75% of the questionnaires back in each of the subgroups 
(biologists, physicists, sociologists, and psychologists).  “Among the sociologists and the 
psychologists the proportion rose to 83%; and, among the 50 ‘more distinguished’ 
representatives of the latter class, it reached 90 percent” (p. 293).   
 Of the entire subgroup of psychologists, 10% expressed belief in God as 
described in the questionnaire, 79% expressed disbelief, and 12% expressed doubt (These 
numbers—10, 79, and 12—do not add up to 100.  Therefore, Leuba (1934), in a footnote 
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on page 294, states, “The total of the believers and doubters in any group should be 100; 
but as I counted as one the halves and the fractions over the half and dropped the other 
fractions, the sum may be 101 or 99.”).  Nine percent expressed belief in personal 
immortality as described in the questionnaire, 70% expressed disbelief, and 91% 
expressed either disbelief or doubt.  As with the First Leuba Study, in the Second Study 
there were differences between the lesser and greater psychologists.  Whereas 13% of the 
lesser psychologists believed in God, only 2% of the greater did.  Likewise, 12% of the 
lesser psychologists believed in immortality, but only 2% of the greater did.  The data 
also showed that the physicists were most likely to believe in God (38%).  Psychologists 
were least likely to believe in God (10%).  The biologists and the sociologists occupied 
intermediary positions.  Leuba concluded that the data revealed that “the larger 
proportions of believers are found in the following categories of persons: (1) the 
scientists who know least about living matter, society, and the mind,” (2) the less eminent 
scholars, and (3) the respondents of the First Leuba Study (p. 299). 
 There is a discrepancy in Leuba’s reporting about his number for the 1933 survey.  
On page 296, he (1934) reported that 2% of the eminent psychologists believed in God.  
Sixteen years later, in his Reformation of the Churches, he (1950) stated the number at 
12%.  This number (12%) was repeated by Brown (2003, p. 617) and Mayer (1959, p. 
82), even though it doesn’t add up appropriately.  The 2% number correctly allows for 
Leuba’s 1933 group’s response to add up to 100%;  12% would have made the number 




The Mayer Study 
 Mayer (1959) sent Leuba’s questionnaire out to all 578 members of the National 
Academy of Sciences in 1958.  After sending two reminders to those addressees who had 
not already responded, Mayer ended up with approximately 65% of the NAS members 
(376) responding.  This group included 35 behavioral scientists:  23 psychologists and 12 
anthropologists.  Instead of using the term “greater,” Mayer referred to the NAS 
psychologists as “Eminent” psychologists.  Of the 23 eminent psychologists, 17 returned 
the questionnaire completed; of the 12 eminent anthropologists, 8 returned the 
questionnaire completed.   
 Six percent of the psychologists expressed belief in God as described on the 
questionnaire, and six percent expressed belief in immortality as described on the 
questionnaire (Mayer, 1959, p. 82).  Mayer also provided data for all the behavioral 
scientists (thus simply combining the psychologists’ and anthropologists’ responses).  
Eight percent of the behavioral scientists as a whole expressed belief in God; likewise, 
eight percent expressed belief in immortality.  Of this group, 10% expressed “intense” 
desire for immortality, 24% expressed “moderate” desire for immortality, and 67% 
expressed no desire for immortality (p. 61). 
 While Mayer stated that, “There is some indication that behavioral scientists, 
when compared to other fields, do not as frequently believe in God,” he also conceded 
that there was not a significant enough difference between the scholars in the different 
fields of specialization in his survey (p. 68).  He had not sent out his survey to as many 
people as Leuba had.  Whereas the questionnaire in the First Leuba Study was sent to 57 
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lesser and 50 greater psychologists, and the questionnaire in the Second Leuba Study was 
sent to 114 lesser and 50 greater psychologists, the Mayer Study sent questionnaires to 
only 23 Eminent (greater) psychologists. 
 As with the Leuba Studies, Mayer received letters and notes from respondents 
saying that they were unable to express religious convictions “by means of a check mark” 
(p. 94), or they wrote that the questionnaire was too personal.  Some “appeared irritated 
at being asked to consider the concept of God within any context” (p. 94).  Mayer 
proposed this explanation: 
The fact that many Eminents seemed disturbed by the whole business of a 
questionary [sic] may suggest emotional involvement with religious 
concepts which have not been personally clarified.  As regards the concept 
of a personal God, some may experience considerable conflict between a 
personal acceptance on the one hand, and a superficial academic rejection 
on the other.  For some the conflict may be between a superficial 
acceptance of the concept of a personal God and a vague awareness of 
commitment to the deterministic position underlying science.... The 
personality characteristics which contribute to success in science may be 
those which are antithetical to religious beliefs.  As Leuba suggested, 
disbelief reflects ‘imaginativeness, nonconforming tendencies, a 
willingness to separate oneself from cultural values, a self-reliance which 
permitted alienation from the group.’ (pp. 95, 98) 
   
 Finally, it must be noted that the Mayer Study is not without error.  For example, 
he reports (p. 82) that the Second Leuba Study stated that 12% of eminent psychologists 
believed in God, but in actuality the Second Leuba Study stated that number to be only 
2% (p. 296).  I must note, however, that even Leuba (1950, p. 47) himself later misstated 
this number as 12%.   
Also, The Mayer Study reported (p. 82) that the First Leuba Study stated that 13% 
of eminent psychologists believed in God and 9% of eminent psychologists believed in 
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immortality, whereas the First Leuba Study actually stated (p. 267) these numbers to be 
13.2% and 8.8% respectively.  In other words, Mayer appears to have further rounded 
these figures without having access to the raw data. 
 
The First Larson Study 
 In 1996, Larson and Witham (1997) mailed the Leuba questionnaire to a sample 
of scientists randomly selected from the 1995 edition of the American Men and Women of 
Science.  However, this First Larson Study included as respondents only biologists, 
mathematicians, physicists, and astronomers, but not psychologists, sociologists, 
historians, anthropologists, or any other group of scholars.  Larson et al (1997) stated that 
they, “replicated Leuba’s [1914] survey as exactly as possible” (p. 435), but 
psychologists were not included—as they were in the First and Second Leuba Studies and 
the Mayer Study.   Also, although the questionnaire used in the First Larson Study (see 
Appendix C) was represented as being “how Leuba phrased his 1916 survey of American 
scientists,” it actually has a few slight differences from the questionnaire used in the First 
Leuba Study (see Appendix A). The questionnaire that was presented in the First Larson 
Study as being the questionnaire used by Leuba in 1916 was actually slightly different 
than that first questionnaire, and slightly different from another very similar questionnaire 
used by Leuba for other purposes.  The questionnaire that the First Larson Study 
represented as Leuba’s questionnaire was not precisely the same as either of the 
questionnaires that Leuba (1916, pp.224-226) mentioned, and it also did not appear to be 
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a questionnaire that was arbitrarily changed, but rather appeared to be the admixture or 
commixture of the two questionnaires Leuba presented. 
Furthermore, the top three numbers (39.3, 45.3, and 14.5) in the second column of 
Table 1 (of the First Larson Study) did not add up to 100, as they apparently should have.  
These numbers were simply percentages of a population whose members each indicated 
one of three options; the three percentages simply should have added up to 100%.  Larson 
et al (1997) did not offer a correction, nor did they state that some respondents might 
have answered the question by checking more than one answer or by checking none of 
the three answers so that the total responses might have added up to more or less than 
100.   
I must note, however, that an accurate and well-written article may have been 
submitted by Larson and Witham and then corrupted in the editing and publishing 
process.  This idea will be further discussed in Chapter 5.  Were it not for the inclusion of 
the display items (e.g., the Table, the depiction of the questionnaire) in this article, it is 
entirely possible that there might have been no errors, inconsistencies, or disingenuous 
statements in this article. 
 
The Second Larson Study 
 In 1998, Larson and Witham (1998) again replicated the First Leuba Study, but 
again they did not include psychologists.  Instead, they sent the questionnaire to all NAS 
members who were biologists, mathematicians, physicists, and astronomers.  So, 
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although four distinct subgroups of eminent scholars were included in this survey, 
eminent psychology scholars were not.   
Furthermore, there were many incorrect numbers in this article.  Approximately 
half of the numbers in Table 1 were incorrect and more than one-third of the numbers in 
the article as a whole were incorrect.  The lower right column of Table 1 in the Second 
Larson Study (1998, p. 313) includes three numbers (7.9, 76.7, and 23.3) that should add 
up to approximately 100, but do not.  Larson (personal communication, November 3, 
2005) stated that the Table was misprinted and that the three numbers should be 41.6, 
45.6, and 13.4.  However, those numbers add up to 100.6; given that there were only 
three numbers and each one went one digit beyond the decimal point, the three numbers 
should have added up to a number no lower than 99.7 and no higher than 100.3.   
Leuba reported that 13% of his eminent psychologists believed in God in 1933, 
but Larson (1998, p. 313) reported that Leuba had said it was 15%. Leuba reported that 
71% of his eminent psychologists disbelieved in God in 1933, but Larson (1998, p. 313) 
reported that Leuba had said it was 68%.  Leuba reported that 16% of his eminent 
psychologists had no definite belief regarding this matter in 1933, but Larson (1998) 
reported that Leuba had said it was 17% (p. 313).  Leuba reported that 15% of his 
eminent psychologists believed in immortality in 1933, but Larson (1998) reported that 
Leuba had said it was 18% (p. 313). Leuba reported that 56% of his eminent 
psychologists disbelieved in immortality in 1933, but Larson (1998) reported that Leuba 
had said it was 53% (p. 313).  The reason for these incorrect numbers was not explained. 
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Larson and Witham (1998) also presented more precise numbers than would have 
been calculable given Leuba’s 1916 data. Leuba reported that approximately 31.7% of his 
eminent psychologists believed in God in 1914, but Larson reported (1998) that Leuba 
had said it was 27.7% (p. 313).  Likewise, Leuba reported that approximately 37% of his 
eminent psychologists believed in immortality in 1914, but the Second Larson Study 
reported that Leuba had said it was 35.2% (p. 313).  In both of these cases, the Second 
Larson Study reported the numbers representing only approximately half of the 
respondents (one “division” rather than both “divisions,” as Leuba called them (1916).   
Larson and Witham also provided percentages that were more precise than 
Leuba’s numbers would have allowed.   For example, Leuba reported that approximately 
50% of his eminent psychologists disbelieved in God in 1914, but Larson reported (1998) 
that Leuba had said it was 52.7% (p. 313).  Leuba reported that approximately 20% of his 
eminent psychologists had no definite belief either way with regard to God in 1914, but 
Larson reported (1998) that Leuba had said it was 20.9% (p. 313). Leuba reported that 
approximately 30% of his eminent psychologists disbelieved in immortality in 1914, but 
Larson reported (1998) that Leuba had said it was 25.4% (p. 313).  Leuba reported that 
approximately 32% of his eminent psychologists had no definite belief either way with 
regard to immortality in 1914, but Larson reported (1998) that Leuba had said it was 
43.7% (p. 313).   
Even within the Second Larson Study article itself can be found inconsistency and 
possible disingenuousness.  In the fourth sentence of the first paragraph, they state that 
amongst Leuba’s 1914 eminent scientists, the number of disbelievers and doubters in the 
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existence of God “rose to near 70%” (p. 313).  However, in the Table 1 next to this 
statement, 52.7% and 20.9% (p. 313) are used to represent this same number.  Adding 
52.7 and 20.9 equals 73.6.  Is it accurate to say that 73.6% is a number that “rose near to 
70%”?   
Also, in reporting their return rates, Larson and Witham stated, “our returns stood 
at about 60% for the 1996 survey and slightly over 50% from NAS members” (1998, p. 
313) [emphasis added].  One wonders whether the authors were possibly representing the 
percentages in a subtly disingenuous manner.  
I must note, again, that an accurate and well-written article may have been 
submitted by Larson and Witham and then corrupted in the editing and publishing 
process.  This idea will be further discussed in Chapter 5.  Were it not for the inclusion of 
the display item (i.e., the Table) in this article, it is entirely possible that there might have 
been no errors, inconsistencies, or disingenuous statements in this article. 
 Any limits to the usefulness of the First and Second Larson Studies might be 
compounded by small errors made by other scholars, such as Wheeler (1997) 
misreporting a number in the Table in the First Larson Study; or larger errors such as 
Mangeloja (2003, pp. 4-5) misreporting that Larson and Witham (1998, 1997) made 
discoveries about “professors of... the social sciences (psychology, anthropology, 
sociology),” although the Larson Studies neither surveyed nor even commented upon 





Religiosity of American University Scholars 
 In 1969, the Carnegie Commission on Higher Education surveyed more than 
60,000 American college professors (Ladd, Lipset, & Trow, 1969; Stark, Iannaccone, & 
Finke, 1996).  In all measures that were taken in that study, the faculty in the “hard” 
sciences (e.g., physics, biology, mathematics) were revealed to be more religious than the 
faculty in the social sciences (Stark et al, 1996).  The data showed that 
it is, above all, faculty in psychology and anthropology who stand as 
towers of unbelief.  The other social sciences remain relatively 
unreligious, but these two fields—the two most closely associated with 
theories of the ‘primitive’ and ‘religious’ mind—are true outliers.  
Compared to faculty in the physical sciences, psychologists and 
anthropologists are almost twice as likely to be irreligious, to never attend 
church, or to have no religion.  The differences are of such magnitude that 
one can scarcely imagine their not influencing the tone of conversation, 
instruction, and research in these two fields.  Indeed, these data suggest to 
us why rational-choice theories of religion evoke widespread skepticism, 
if not outright hostility among most social scientists. (Stark et al, 1996, p. 
436) 
 
 That survey found that 33% of psychology professors in America were 
“religious” whereas 60% of mathematicians, for example, were religious (Stark et al, 
1996, p. 436). 
 More recently, though, a yet-to-be-published survey (Glenn, 2005a; Glenn, 
2005b; “Spirituality high among university scientists,” 2005) done by E.H. Ecklund and 
C. Scheitle has reportedly found that religiousness has become more prevalent amongst 
social-science professors than amongst natural-science professors.  The survey, of 1,646 
professors at 21 top-tier research universities “covers scholars in three natural-science 
fields (physics, chemistry, and biology) and four social sciences (sociology, economics, 
political science, and psychology).  Among the natural scientists, 55.4 percent of the 
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respondents identified themselves as atheists or agnostics.  Only 47.5 percent of the 
social scientists said the same” (Glenn, 2005a).   
 According to Glenn (2005a), at least one of the survey’s researchers has proposed 
that the shift of religiosity from natural sciences to social sciences has occurred because 
women—who tend to be more religious than men—have joined the ranks of social-
sciences faculties at a rate much greater than they have joined the natural-science 
faculties: 27% of the social scientists in the more recent study were women, whereas only 
16.7% of natural scientists were women.    
 Also, the Ecklund and Scheitle’s survey did not include anthropology 
professors—one of the two subgroups that was least likely to be found to be “irreligious” 
in the Carnegie Commission’s survey. 
 
Religious Beliefs of Americans, Physicians, Psychiatrists and Psychotherapists 
 Curlin, Lantos, Roach, Sellergen, and Chen (2005) surveyed U.S. physicians and 
used General Social Survey (NORC, 1998) data to estimate and compare the religious 
beliefs of Americans in general and American physicians.  Curlin et al. (2005) found that 
76% of physicians expressed a belief in God, and that 83% of the general U.S. population 
expressed a belief in God (p. 631).  Likewise, it was found that 59% of the U.S. 
physicians held a belief in “life after death,” whereas 74% of people in the general U.S. 
population held such a belief (p. 631).  The data for these two groups were collected 
separately, by different organizations.  There were other differences—such as the surveys 
having been administered in different decades: for example, one survey was administered 
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approximately seven years after the other.  The percentage of Americans who expressed 
belief in God was very close to the percentage found in a more recent survey: Gallup and 
Jones (2000) found that 79% of Americans “know God exists and... have no doubts about 
it....” (p. 187) 
 There have been other relatively recent surveys of religious beliefs of 
professionals who concern themselves with individuals’ physical or mental health and 
behavior.  Neeleman and King (1993) surveyed psychiatrists who were working in 
several London teaching hospitals and found that 23% expressed a belief in God and that 
27% reported a religious affiliation of some kind.  Jensen (1986) surveyed a sample of 
U.S. mental health professionals: clinical psychologists, psychiatrists, clinical social 
workers, and marriage and family therapists.  This survey found that psychotherapists 
were less active in conventional religious activity than the general population.  However, 
an analysis of this survey by Bergin and Jensen (1990) determined that, although 
psychotherapists demonstrate lower rates of participation in conventional religious 
activities, there was nevertheless a substantial amount of spiritual or religious 
involvement “beyond or in addition to traditional conventions.  There may be a reservoir 
of spiritual interests among therapists that is often unexpressed due to the secular 
framework of professional education and practice” (p.3). 
 
The Various Cultures of Psychology 
 While the phrase “the two cultures” is sometimes used explicitly (e.g., Van 
Leeuwen, 1998; Nunez, Poole, & Memon, 2003) in psychology,  the concept of different 
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cultures in psychology has been communicated in other ways as well without necessarily 
using the words “the two cultures” (e.g., Lilienfeld, 2004; Goode, 2004; Wertheimer & 
Wertheimer, 1996; Shepard, 2001).  The “Two cultures” may refer to scientific and 
humanistic (Wertheimer & Wertheimer, 1996), empirical and romantic (McHugh, 1994), 
science and “alternative ways of knowing” (Nunez et al., 2003), clinical and nonclinical 
(Nunez et al., 2003), researchers and practitioners (Goode, 2004), “positivist and 
scientistic” and “post-positivist and humanistic” (Van Leeuwen, 1998), Christian and 
non-Christian (Shepard, 2001), or “soft” psychology versus all other psychology (Meehl, 
1978). 
 Simonton (2004) demonstrated that psychology is a scientific discipline, and that 
it would reasonably be placed closer to biology than to sociology in the nature of its 
scientific status.  Psychology’s beginnings as a scientific discipline have been placed in 
about the middle of the nineteenth century in Germany (Fuchs & Milar, 2003).  However, 
since at least the 1950s, there have been efforts to get “psychology to work its way free 
from a dependence on simplistic theories of correct scientific conduct” (Wertheimer, 
2004).  As mentioned, above, science is not the only culture in psychology.  There are at 
least two cultures—and maybe more than two (Kimble, 1984). 
 The humanistic, clinical, and practitioners tend to look at intuition and alternative 
ways of knowing much more than scientific or empirical psychologists (e.g., Lilienfeld, 
2004; Goode, 2004; Nunez et al., 2003).  “Empiricists believe that questions regarding 
human nature are best settled by scientific evidence, whereas romantics believe that such 
questions are best settled by intuition” (Lilienfeld, 2004, p. 1251).  A common sentiment 
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of researchers is that clinical psychologists are “out of touch with research findings” 
(Goode, 2004). 
 Is there a culture of God in psychology?  Ellis (2000) found his rational emotive 
behavior therapy to be compatible with many clients who have “absolutistic philosophies 
about God and religion” (p. 29).  Aron (2004) found,  
the effort to talk openly and directly about religious differences and the 
implications for psychoanalysis is enormously complicated and filled with 
a variety of dangers.... Religion generally, and God in particular, have 
remained taboo among analysts.  And feelings about God run strong.  
Some people... have directly confronted me with their outrage. ‘Why are 
you bringing God into a professional meeting?  If I want to hear about 
God I can go to my church or synagogue; why bring God into a 
psychoanalytic forum?’  Religious conflict, repression, and deep fears 
about religion pervade the history of psychoanalysis. (pp. 442-443) 
 
Vande Kamp (1986) suggested that putting God in the center of psychology is a futile 
attempt to restore psychology to its original theological servant status.  De Young (1976) 
outlined ways in which he saw psychology as a religion itself, especially in the realm of 
psychotherapy. 
 
The Relationship Between Religion and Science 
 There seems to be great tension between science and religion.  Many laypeople in 
the U.S. do not believe that their religious views are compatible with science (Raloff, 
1996).  There is a widespread public perception that science and religion are antithetical 
(Raloff, 1996).  Within the scientific community, there is considerable controversy about 
whether or not any kind of religion is acceptable, or even whether religious people should 
be allowed to be scientific leaders (Easterbrook, 1997).   
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Stories have been told that highlight these attitudes:  While giving a speech at a 
conference that was funded by a foundation that seeks to build bridges between science 
and religion, Nobel-Prize winning physicist Steve Weinberg once stated, “I am all in 
favor of a dialogue between science and religion, but not a constructive dialogue” 
(Horgan, 2006, p. B18).  Raymond Damadian, the inventor of the magnetic resonance 
imaging scanner, is widely believed to have been passed over for the 2003 Nobel Prize 
for Medicine because he happened to believe in creationism (Chang, 2004).  On a societal 
scale, a general survey of European Citizens found that the people who attended religious 
services more frequently, were less likely to give correct answers on a science quiz 
(European Commission, 2005). 
Attempts have been made at bridging the gap between science and non-empirical 
ways of viewing the world (e.g., Gould, 1997; Snow, 1959; Begley, 2006; Proctor, 2003).  
“A resolution might remain all neat and clean if the nonoverlapping magisteria of science 
and religion were separated by an extensive no man’s land.  But, in fact, the two 
magisteria bump right up against each other, inter-digitating in wondrously complex 
ways along their joint border” (Gould, 1997, p. 17).  “What science is is settled 
methodologically.  It’s not that science rules out the supernatural as a precondition.  But 
scientists want to apprehend the world, and there is no procedure for studying the 






The "Secularization Thesis” 
 The secularization thesis proposes that religious activity will decline as science, 
rationality, technology, and education levels increase.  This definition of the 
secularization thesis is consistent with Leuba’s hypothesis that, "if knowledge is, as it 
seems, a cause of the decline of the traditional beliefs, that decline will presumably 
continue as long as the increase in knowledge" (1934, p. 300).   
 The scholars who have articulated, debated, supported, and criticized the 
secularization thesis have not achieved consensus on how to define the secularization 
thesis, much less whether or not it is correct.  It has been defined as a “general theory of 
societal change” (Lechner, 1991, p. 1104), but also as a theory that reveals how 
individuals act (Albrecht & Heaton, 1984).  It has been challenged as being “not a sound 
theory” at all (Crippen, 1992, p. 220).  And yet others claim that, “reports of the death of 
secularization theory have been greatly exaggerated” (Yamane, 1997, p. 109). 
 It is a poignant comment, perhaps on sociology in general but 
certainly on the sociology of religion, that its practitioners are in such 
profound disagreement about the central implications of present-day 
religious practice, belief, and institutions.  It would not be difficult to 
document, from the work of the principle exponents of the discipline, the 
most radically divergent appraisals of the state of religion and religiosity.  
The secularization thesis, which summarizes self-evident truth to some, is 
rejected out of hand by others, who, however, approach the subject from 
quite diverse perspectives and who do not necessarily agree among 
themselves.  Nor has the debate been sequential: contradictory appraisals 
have appeared virtually simultaneously and quite independently.... 
Economists are by no means so perplexed about whether modern society 
has seen a process of industrialization, nor are political scientists in 
fundamental dispute about democratization or bureaucratization.  But the 
sociologists of religion differ radically over the reality of secularization. 





This chapter reviewed the First Leuba Study and the subsequent replications that 
were performed in the ensuing decades by Leuba himself and then by Mayer and Larson 
and Witham.  The results of those surveys showed that, of the eminent psychology 
scholars, 13.2% believed in God and 8.8% believed in immortality in 1914, 2% believed 
both in God and in immortality in 1933, and 6% believed in both God and immortality in 
1958.  It has also been shown herein that each of the studies—as published—appeared to 
be deficient in some way:  For example, the Leuba Studies did not provide sufficient raw 
data, the Mayer Study misreported at least one datum from the Second Leuba Study, and 
some of the numbers in the Tables in the Larson Studies are misreported.   
This chapter also reviewed the religiosity of other segments of our society, as well 
as the relationships between religion, science, and psychology.  Finally, it explored the 




CHAPTER 3:  METHODOLOGY 
Method 
 Descriptive research was used in this study.  It was descriptive in that it used a 
written questionnaire and interviews to gather data from a population being studied.  The 
potential respondents (see Appendix D) were mailed a questionnaire (see Appendix F) by 
me.  Enclosed with the questionnaire was a cover letter (see Appendix E).  These were 
mailed in an envelope with the addressee’s name and address hand-written by me (see 
Appendix G).  (Please note that I sent one of each mailing to myself in addition to the 
respondents listed in Appendix D, and that I photocopied these mailings to myself for 
inclusion in Appendices E, G, H, I, J, and L; it should be noted that the relevant 
addressees for this survey were actually the people listed in Appendix D who had not yet 
responded.)  If the potential respondents were willing to be interviewed by telephone, by 
email, or in person, they indicated this on the questionnaire.  Then, those data were 
organized and presented systematically so as to provide factual and accurate information 
about the population.   
 Although descriptive research provides data about the population being studied, it 
cannot help determine what causes a particular behavior or occurrence—it cannot 
determine a causal relationship between variables.  The research problems were 
identified.  The hypotheses were formed.  The data were analyzed.  And finally the 
results were reported to the appropriate discourse community. 
 Thus, this was a quantitative study, but it was also a qualitative study.  
“Qualitative findings may be presented alone or in combination with quantitative data.  
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Recent developments in the evaluation profession have led to an increase in the use of 
multiple methods, including combinations of qualitative and quantitative data” (Patton, 
1990, pp. 10-11).  The data collection method included a brief questionnaire sent to each 
respondent via the United States Postal Service mail system.  The first part of the survey 
instrument was a questionnaire that was developed by James Leuba (see Appendix A) in 
1914 and was administered to the entire population.  The original questionnaire included 
three questions.  The current research added onto that original questionnaire five 
statements requesting that the respondent indicate agreement or disagreement using a 
Likert scale; the questionnaire also added an open-ended statement inviting respondents 
to provide more information about their religious or spiritual beliefs.  The questionnaire 
used in the current project is in Appendix F and can be contrasted with the questionnaire 
used in the First Leuba Study (see Appendix A).  The current project also added a 
question to the questionnaire asking if the respondent would be willing to be interviewed 
and, if so, how.  Consequently, interviews with some of the respondents took place. 
 
Research Questions 
1.  To what extent do eminent psychology scholars believe in God? 
2.  To what extent do eminent psychology scholars believe in immortality? 
3.  Has the percentage of the eminent psychology scholars who believe in God changed 
since 1914? 
4.  Has the percentage of the eminent psychology scholars who believe in immortality 
changed since 1914? 
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The survey was administered by mailing a questionnaire (Appendix F) to the 
respondents.  The first part of the questionnaire primarily covered three questions:  1) 
Does the respondent believe in God, 2) Does the respondent believe in immortality, and 
3) Does the respondent desire immortality?  The exact phrasing of the questionnaire was 
patterned after the First Leuba and Mayer questionnaires (Appendices A and B) and was 
stated as follows: 
1.  Concerning the belief in God:  
a.  I believe in a God to whom one may pray in the expectation of receiving an 
answer. By “answer,” I mean more than the subjective, psychological effect of 
prayer..................  
b.  I do not believe in a God as defined above..................  
c.  I have no definite belief regarding this question...................  
   
2.  Concerning the belief in personal immortality, i.e., the belief in continuation of 
a person after death in another world:  
a.  I believe in - personal immortality for all people...........  
- conditional immortality, i.e., immortality for those who have       
reached a certain state of development..........  
b.  I believe neither in conditional nor in unconditional immortality of the 
           person in another world..........  
c.  I have no definite belief regarding this question..........  
3.  I desire personal immortality 
intensely..........  
 moderately...........  
 not at all............ 
 
 There have been several slightly varying versions of the questionnaire, but only 
the First Leuba Study and the Mayer Study provided reliable versions of the 
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questionnaire that were actually used with eminent psychology scholars.  Also, as Mayer 
stated, “It should be kept in mind that the concept of God which Leuba proposed was 
special and specific.... Its sole purpose is to provide an opportunity of indicating disbelief 
in this concept.  To quibble about the finer shadings of meaning which are possible is to 
engage in metaphysical polemics” (1959, p. 8). 
 Leuba (1916), the creator of the questionnaire, made these comments with regard 
to it: 
 In the present status of religion and of philosophy, there is only one 
fundamentally significant classification of the various conceptions of God.  On 
the one side must be placed the conceptions that are consistent with the means of 
worship common to all the religions, original Buddhism and Comptism excepted; 
on the other, those that are not.  Every book of worship at present in use implies a 
Being in direct affective and intellectual relation with his worshippers; a Being, 
therefore, endowed with will, feeling, and intelligence.  The surrender of that 
conception would mean either the disappearance or the radical transformation of 
practically all the religions known to history. 
 Who would recognize the Christian religion, either Protestant or Roman 
Catholic, were all traces of direct communication with the Divinity now indicated 
in its liturgies to be removed?  The Christian God and the knowable First Cause 
of Spencer, or the impassible Absolute of most contemporary philosophers, are 
essentially different conceptions which can be used interchangeably neither in 
religion nor in philosophy.... 
 The expression ‘personal immortality’ is usually understood to mean the 
continuation after death of the conscious individual and implies the continuation 
of the sense of one’s identity.  Any conception which does not include this sense 
of identity is not the one intended here.  (pp.173-174) 
 
 Leuba (1916) further stated, with regard to justifying how the questionnaire 
(Appendix A) was articulated: 
 Readers may ask themselves why I did not formulate statements 
which would have separated more definitely those who merely lack the 
beliefs expressed in A1 and B1, from those ready to affirm their falsity.  
But can a sharp line of demarcation be drawn between these two attitudes?  
Evidently not; the terms, belief, unbelief, doubt, uncertainty, are 
susceptible of endless gradation.... In attempting to refine, should probably 
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have made matters worse.  As a matter of fact, few were seriously troubled 
by the indefiniteness of these terms, and my purpose was as well, perhaps 
better served by the statements of the questionnaire as by any others. (pp. 
242-243) 
 
Selection of Participants 
 The participants for the study were members of the National Academy of 
Sciences who are listed in the "psychology section."  There were 62 NAS members in the 
psychology section (see Appendix D) during 2006-2007.  Not included were the section’s 
Foreign Associates and Emeritus members. 
 Curlin (2005, p.631) made a distinction between eligible and ineligible 
respondents (deceased or had incorrect address).  Leuba, on the other hand, appeared to 
make presumptions about how many potential respondents were not responding because 
they were dead or too ill (1916).  This study was an attempt at being a census survey.  All 
members of the population were mailed questionnaires; none were presumed dead, ill, 
incapacitated, or ineligible. 
 
Feasibility  
 Two main problems drove the concern about feasibility.  First was the question of 
whether the addressees would, in fact, return the questionnaires.  Second was the cost of 
the survey. 
 Considerable evidence suggests that the previous incarnations of this survey had 
high return rates, and that behavioral scientists have been even more likely than other 
scientists and academics to return such a questionnaire.  In the First Leuba Study, of the 
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50 participants, only 4 did not return the questionnaire and 8 returned it blank.  In the 
Second Leuba Study, 90% returned the questionnaire.  In the Mayer Study, almost 74% 
of NAS psychologists returned their questionnaires.  The Second Larson Study had a 
return rate of "slightly over 50%" (p. 313) for the NAS members it surveyed; however, 
that survey did not include any behavioral scientists.  The First Larson Study had a return 
rate of "about 60 percent" (p. 435), but it also did not include any eminent psychology 
scholars. 
 It is precisely this population from which the greatest return rate should have been 
expected.  In discussing the return rates in his Second Study, Leuba noted, "Among the 
sociologists and the psychologists the proportion rose to 83 per cent; and, among the 50 
more distinguished representatives of the latter class, it reached 90 per cent" (1934, p. 
293).  In the Mayer Study, the return rates were highest, by far, for the psychologists, at 
almost 74% (1959, p. 14).  Visher, likewise, obtained the highest rate of returns from 
behavioral scientists.   
 Not only was this population more likely than most others to return this 
questionnaire, but some strategies could be used to increase the likelihood of 
questionnaires being returned.  Toops (1926), for example, achieved a 100% return rate 
after mailing out six letters to his respondents—the last of which was a promise not to 
send any more if the form was completed and returned.  This strategy was used in this 
study only to an extent: four mailings were sent out instead of six—and this study did not 
include in the final mailing the promise not to send any more. 
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 Curlin, Lantos, Roach, Sellergren, and Chin (2005) achieved a 63% return rate for 
their questionnaire sent to U.S. physicians seeking information about their religious 
characteristics—even though it was 12 pages long.  In describing the three separate 
waves of mailings of the questionnaire, Curlin (personal communication, January 2, 
2006) stated, "733 responded to the first wave.  224 to the second.  88 were recruited to 
respond by calling them and faxing recruitment letters several weeks after the second 
wave.  Finally, 99 responded to the third wave.”  In the third wave, Curlin noted, the 
respondents were told they would receive $20.00 for participation.  The current survey 
likewise mailed the questionnaire three times and included a two-dollar bill and a note to 
the potential respondents in the last mailing (see Appendix K).  The last mailing was the 
fourth mailing, but it was only the third to include the questionnaire.  The note included 
in the last mailing stated that the two-dollar bill was a gift, that the respondent would 
receive a check for $20.00 if they completed and returned the questionnaire, and also that 
they would receive $5,000.00 if they were the first respondent to identify any manner in 
which I breached my promise of confidentiality to them. 
 Even in the unlikely event that it would have become necessary to provide the 
monetary incentive to most of the respondents in the current study, the cost of the total 
project (including postage, envelopes, letters, questionnaires, phone calls, and monetary 
incentives) would not have exceeded $1500.00—unless I breached my promise of 
confidentiality and was contacted by a respondent asking for the $5,000.00. 
 As of the writing of this dissertation, I have no evidence that any of the 
respondents kept or spent any of the money that was sent to them.  Appendix M shows 
 
 41 
that some of the respondents returned the money to me.   42BP and 52BZ both returned 
the two-dollar bills with notes declining to participate in the survey.  51BY returned the 
two-dollar bill and the questionnaire not completed.  04AD returned the two-dollar bill 
with the completed questionnaire and wrote, “I find it offensive to be sent money with 
this questionnaire. Please do not send the $20.”  25AY returned the $20.00 check with a 
note saying the money was unnecessary, but requested a summary of the study findings 
when available.  In a study of religion, it is not unreasonable to wonder whether or not a 
population perhaps worships money as some people apparently do.  There are no 
particular data in this study that would strongly support that claim. 
 
Timetable and Plan for Mailing Questionnaires and Interviewing 
 Fowler (1993) showed that the greatest likelihood of a good return rate on a 
mailed survey occurred if 1) the survey was brief, easy to fill out, and included mostly 
closed questions, 2) non-response triggered follow-up reminders (perhaps even including 
a request via telephone call), 3) the entire mailing was professional in appearance, and 4) 
the recipient had no reason to think the survey was the first step in a sales pitch.  The 
current study adheres to these guidelines. 
 The respondents received up to three separate mailings of the questionnaire, and a 
separate mailed postcard reminder.  The first wave of these mailings was sent on the 
same day (November 17, 2006) including the one addressed to the one respondent outside 
of the country.  Included in the first mailing were the questionnaire, a letter, and a 
stamped and addressed return envelope.  The letter included the information required by 
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the University of Texas Institutional Review Board (IRB).   Mayer's (1959) and Putman's 
(2001) dissertation cover letters were used as models for the letter I included in my 
mailing, and in a few places strings of words were copied verbatim.  Also included was a 
stamped and addressed return envelope. 
 Eleven days later (November 29, 2006), a postcard reminder was mailed to the 
non-respondents reminding them of the survey and asking them to participate.  The 
postcard (see Appendix H) was patterned somewhat after Mayer’s reminder postcard 
(1959). 
 Almost one month after the initial mailing (December 13, 2006), a reminder letter 
was mailed to those people who had not returned the questionnaire.  This reminder letter 
(see Appendix I) was almost identical to the first letter.  This mailing included a copy of 
the questionnaire and a stamped and addressed return envelope. 
 Two months after the initial mailing, another reminder letter (see Appendix J) was 
mailed to those people who had not yet returned the questionnaire.  Enclosed in the 
envelope that was mailed were the letter (see Appendix J), the questionnaire (see 
Appendix F), an uncirculated two-dollar bill, an addressed and stamped return envelope, 
and a postcard note (see Appendix K) offering more money and appreciation. The 
respondents were not given the opportunity to decline to accept the monetary incentive—
Curlin (personal communication, January 2, 2006) reports that this policy worked for his 
study. 
 The respondents’ questionnaires were self-administered and remain confidential 
and anonymous.  In order to prevent successive mailings to people who had already 
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returned the questionnaire, a unique respondent code number was typed on the back of 
each questionnaire.  If a respondent indicated on the questionnaire a willingness to 
participate in a follow-up interview, I personally contacted the respondent and conducted 
an interview.  If the respondent initially expressed a willingness to be interviewed, but 
then later changed his mind or was for any reason unable or unwilling to participate 
further, then I immediately removed the respondent from the list of people to be 
interviewed.  Participation was voluntary for the participants at every stage and could be 
ceased at any stage. 
 I am the only person who conducted the interviews (Appendices N-T).  I 
interviewed the respondents via telephone with one exception—a respondent who wished 
to do it via email.   In some cases, the telephone interviews were arranged via email.  The 
respondents were telephoned and reminded about the survey and asked if they would 
mind if the interview was recorded in compliance with IRB policies that I stated to them.  
I then began recording the interview to be transcribed later.   
For the interviews, I had developed questions partly based on what each 
respondent had written on his questionnaire, but I also engaged in improvisation based on 
where the respondent was leading the interview.  This was true even to the extent that I 
was willing to dispose of all of my previously-prepared potential questions if it seemed 
they had little utility in getting genuine and useful responses from the interviewee.  Also, 
the interviews were conducted in the chronological order in which they appear 
alphabetically in the appendices—and the respondents’ statements in earlier interviews 
affected my questions and statements in later interviews.  I attempted to be perceptive 
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and to use intuition in determining how to conduct each interview.  I made it a priority to 
diplomatically end any interview as quickly as possible if I sensed through verbal or 
nonverbal cues that the interviewee was no longer interested in being interviewed or if 
the interviewee seemed to have nothing more of substance to offer. 
 The questionnaires were mailed, received, and recorded only by me, with no 
assistance or interference from anyone else.  Likewise, the interviews were conducted 
and transcribed only by me.  
 
Survey Strengths, Problems and Solutions 
It is sometimes difficult or impossible to know how much a researcher’s bias 
might be a problem in a study.  It has been shown that researchers’ expectations and 
biases can and do influence the outcomes of studies (Rosenthal & Fode, 1963).  
Researchers have been shown to inadvertently and unintentionally communicate their 
expectations to the participants in various subtle ways, and then the participants may read 
the researchers’ subtle signals and respond to the survey differently than they might 
otherwise have responded (Rosenthal, 1966).  It has even been demonstrated that the 
experimental performance of supposedly relatively unintelligent animals such as rats can 
be influenced by this type of experimenter bias (Rosenthal & Fode, 1963).    So if it is 
possible for a researcher’s bias to influence a rat’s behavior in an experiment, then it is 
certainly a problem to be aware of in more sensitive animals such as human beings.  How 
can it be avoided, though?  Not only did I (the current study’s researcher) remain 
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conscious and vigilant against any such biases, but I also did everything possible to 
remain “faithful” to the previous incarnations of which this is a replication.  
 One problem that I was unconcerned about was “demand characteristics,” aspects 
of the study that reveal to the participants, in some manner, what the actual hypotheses 
are (Orne, 1962).  I shared any and all information with the participants that they asked 
for—including the first three chapters of this dissertation and the letter of approval from 
the University of Texas IRB to me.  The participants also might have been aware of the 
previous incarnations of the survey.  Many of the respondents may have actually read the 
Larson Studies that were published in Nature.  Also, some of the respondents may have 
been friends or associates of Mayer or the late Clarence James Leuba, both psychology 
scholars, the former being the author of the Mayer Study and the latter being the son of 
the author of the First and Second Leuba Studies.  In either case, it would not be 
surprising if the respondents had some familiarity with one of the studies.   
These things being true, it was doubtful that the respondents cared much about 
pleasing me or being “good subjects.”  They were, after all, eminent scholars with little to 
lose from completing a questionnaire with integrity.  However, there may have been a 
social desirability bias in this study:  “Sometimes people respond to a survey question in 
a way that reflects not how they truly feel or what they truly believe, but how they think 
they should respond.  That is, they attempt to create a positive picture of themselves—
one that is socially desirable.”  (Goodwin, 1998, p. 388) 
 Another potential problem is the “Don’t waste my time” issue:  Each respondent 
had his own goals to pursue and might not have been inclined to spend even a single 
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minute participating in even the most important survey.  A reluctance or refusal to 
participate in any survey—regardless of the content or brevity of the survey—could 
simply have been a manifestation of the legitimate expression, “What’s in it for me?”  
However, this was likely a minimal obstacle.  The entire questionnaire was brief enough 
so that the respondents were likely to be able to easily complete it in a few minutes.  
 Overall, with adequate return rates, a well-designed questionnaire can be more 
efficient and less expensive than other kinds of surveys while still yielding valuable data 
(Goodwin, 1998). 
 
Reliability and Validity 
As part of the larger First Leuba Study beyond the distinct part that focused on 
eminent psychologists, Leuba did two separate surveys of 500 random samples of the 
men listed in the 1910 edition of American Men of Science, using essentially the same 
questionnaire that he used for the eminent psychologists.  The data provided by the First 
Leuba Study (pp. 222, 252) indicated that the reliability, the consistency and stability of 
the survey numbers, was high for this questionnaire. 
 Construct validity is the extent to which a higher-order construct is represented in 
a particular study.  Leuba, in the following quote, provided solid evidence for the 
construct validity of the questionnaire: 
 In the present status of religion and of philosophy, there is only one 
fundamentally significant classification of the various conceptions of God.  On 
the one side must be placed the conceptions that are consistent with the means of 
worship common to all the religions, original Buddhism and Comptism excepted; 
on the other, those that are not.  Every book of worship at present in use implies a 
Being in direct affective and intellectual relation with his worshippers; a Being, 
 
 47 
therefore, endowed with will, feeling, and intelligence.  The surrender of that 
conception would mean either the disappearance or the radical transformation of 
practically all the religions known to history. 
 Who would recognize the Christian religion, either Protestant or Roman 
Catholic, were all traces of direct communication with the Divinity now indicated 
in its liturgies to be removed?  The Christian God and the knowable First Cause 
of Spencer, or the impassible Absolute of most contemporary philosophers, are 
essentially different conceptions which can be used interchangeably neither in 
religion nor in philosophy.... 
 The expression ‘personal immortality’ is usually understood to mean the 
continuation after death of the conscious individual and implies the continuation 
of the sense of one’s identity.  Any conception which does not include this sense 
of identity is not the one intended here.  (1916, pp. 173-174) 
 
Internal validity, on the other hand, is “the ability to infer that a causal 
relationship exists between two variables” (Johnson & Christensen, 2004, p. 230).   It 
appeared that this survey would have internal validity if Leuba’s prediction was correct.  
In other words, "If knowledge is, as it seems, a cause of the decline of the traditional 
beliefs, that decline will presumably continue as long as the increase in knowledge" 
(1934, p. 300).  On the other hand, “the validity and reliability of qualitative data depend 
to a great extent on the... sensitivity and integrity of the researcher” (Patton, 1990, p. 11). 
 
Analysis of the Data 
In order to decrease the likelihood of errors due to data entry in the computer, all 
of the questionnaire data were entered twice (separately and by different people) and then 
the two resulting files were compared.  Inconsistencies were identified and errors were 
corrected against the original questionnaires.  The interviews were transcribed and then 




 A sophisticated statistical analysis of the questionnaire data was unnecessary and 
may have been counterproductive.   
Remember that throughout the process in which you conceive, 
plan, execute, and write up a research, it is on your informed judgment as 
a scientist that you must rely, and this holds as much for the statistical 
aspects of the work as it does for all the others. This means that your 
informed judgment governs the setting of the parameters involved in the 
planning… and that informed judgment also governs the conclusions you 
will draw.… Gerd Gigerenzer showed how and why no single royal road 
of drawing conclusions from data is possible, and particularly not one that 
does not strongly depend on the substantive issues concerned—that is, on 
everything that went into the research besides the number crunching.  An 
essential ingredient in the research process is the judgment of the scientist. 
 He or she must decide by how much a theoretical proposition has been 
advanced by the data, just as he or she decided what to study, what data to 
get, and how to get it…. Some scientists, physicists for example, manage 
without the statistics, although to be sure not without the informed 
judgment.  Indeed, some pretty good psychologists have managed without 
statistical inference:  There come to mind Wundt, Kohler, Piaget, Lewin, 
Bartlett, Stevens, and if you'll permit me, Freud, among others.  Indeed, 
Skinner (1957) thought of dedicating his book Verbal Behavior (and I 
quote) "to the statisticians and scientific methodologists with whose help 
this book would never have been completed" (p. 111).  (Cohen, 1990, pp. 
1310-1311) 
 
Because this study had a relatively elegant design, the basic results were self-
evident—at least with regard to “what happened”—and are presented in Chapter 4.  
However, the raw data, all of which are presented in the appendices, perhaps manifest 
within themselves the truest and most complete meanings without putatively 
sophisticated gobbledygook being thrust upon them or extracted from them by me.  
Nevertheless, in Chapter 5, I will propose interpretations that might be imputed on the 
data. 
I coded and categorized into common themes various aspects from the interviews 
and from  the comments written on the questionnaires.  This generally happened after I 
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had finished collecting all the data, but I had also engaged in memoing during data 
collection and was constantly attempting to use participants’ responses to improve 
successive interviews. 
 All the previous studies (First and Second Leuba, Mayer, and First and Second 
Larson) had included significant information about respondents’ extra comments that 
went beyond answering the three main questions on the survey.  For example, “Many of 
the scientists wrote letters stating their inability to express religious convictions by means 
of a check mark.  Others said the questionary was too personal, and appeared irritated at 
being asked to consider the concept of God within any context.” (Mayer, 1959, p. 94)  
One respondent wrote, “I am refraining from complying with your request because I 
believe that real harm is done in announcing to the world the opinions of scientists 
relative to religious matters” (Leuba, 1934, p. 293).  In the current survey, extra 
comments were welcomed, as were interviews.  The extra data were analyzed to find 
recurring themes and possibly develop new theories or new avenues for research. 
 
Summary 
 This chapter summarized the quantitative and qualitative methods used in this 
study, reviewed the research questions, discussed the way in which the survey was 
conducted, documented and analyzed, as well as the feasibility of the project and its 
potential strengths and problems.  
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CHAPTER FOUR:  SURVEY RESULTS 
Introduction 
 This chapter includes the questionnaire response rate, the timeline of events, 
information about demographics of the respondents, the questionnaire item responses, 
and the common or recurring themes in the questionnaires and interviews (with quotes 
from the respondents to support and illustrate the themes). 
The most common sentiments expressed on the questionnaire were generally 
along the lines of these quotes:  “I think deism (belief in Gods & spiritual afterlife) is a 
pernicious delusion” (01AA); "I don't believe it (immortality) is possible or meaningful" 
(02AB);  “Religious beliefs are nonsense, and the sooner Homo sapiens moves on from 
these primitive beliefs, the better” (30BD); “I am an atheist and I experience no conflict 
or doubts about my lack of belief in God or the afterlife” (36BJ); and “Understanding the 
natural world does not, in my view, require any assumption about there being an 
omnipotent god.  Nature is wonderful enough without resorting to superstition and magic.  
The idea of immortality may give comfort to some (or many) but it is supported only by 
faith.  Our existence is subject to the laws of nature—in particular, neuroscience” (38BL). 
 
Response Rate, Timeline, and Demographics 
 The response rate for the questionnaire was slightly above 61.29% (38 out of the 
62 members).  Nine of the respondents volunteered for follow-up interviews.  Of those 9, 
6 were actually interviewed via telephone and 1 did an email interview.  All interviewees 
agreed to have the interviews recorded.  
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 The questionnaire (see Appendix F) was mailed with the first letter (Appendix E) 
on November 17, 2006.  The reminder postcard (Appendix H) was mailed on November 
28, 2006.  The questionnaire was mailed with the second letter (Appendix I) on 
December 13, 2006.  The questionnaire was mailed with the third letter (Appendix J), a 
two-dollar bill, and a postcard-size note (Appendix K) on January 17, 2007. 
Each respondent who returned a completed questionnaire either received a 
confirmation letter (Appendix L) or was contacted at least once if they had indicated a 
willingness to be interviewed.  Each respondent whose questionnaire was returned after 
January 17, 2006, was mailed a confirmation letter (Appendix L) and a check for $20.00 
(except for 04AD who explicitly stated, “Please do not send the $20.”). 
 Scant demographic information is provided herein because the number of 
potential participants is relatively small, all of the potential participants have been 
identified by name, and I had promised confidentiality to them within that context.  The 
average age of the NAS psychology members during 2006-2007 was in the mid- to late 
70s, but the average age of the respondents is not disclosed.  The overwhelming number 
of the 2006-2007 NAS psychology members were male, so it can be deduced that most of 
the respondents in this survey are male (even if all of the potential female respondents did 
respond).  No information about respondents’ institutions or geographic locations is 
disclosed.  The response data in Appendix M reveals when a questionnaire was received 
from a respondent, but no information regarding postmarks is disclosed.   
 All information sent to the potential respondents was coded with six-digit 
alphanumeric codes, but those codes were randomly changed to four-digit alphanumeric 
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codes for publication in this dissertation to maintain confidentiality for the respondents in 
case their assistants or family members opened their mail before giving it to them.  Thus, 
each alphanumeric code representing an individual herein is different than the 
alphanumeric code that was used for that individual during data collection. 
 A few deletions and changes were made to the respondents’ comments in order to 
obscure their identities.  These deletions or changes are made explicit by the use of 
ellipses or brackets.  No deletion or change went unacknowledged.  An example of a 
change that was made can be found in line 898 of the interviews: I replaced the actual 
species of household pets that were mentioned by the respondent with “[household pets]” 




 The questionnaire item responses are shown in Table 1.   The raw data can be 
found in Appendix M.  Table 2 compares the responses from this study with responses 




Participants’ Responses to Questionnaire Statements #1-8 
 Belief  Disbelief   Neither 
1. Concerning God 
1  33  3   
2.6%  86.8%  7.9%  
 
2. Concerning immortality 
 0  35  3  




3. Desiring immortality 
 Intense Moderate Not at all 
 4  6  23 
 10.5%  15.8%  60.5% 
=================================== 
 
 Strongly Somewhat   Somewhat Strongly 
 Agree  Agree   Neither Disagree Disagree Total  
 
4. The idea of God seems quite unnecessary. 
21  3  6  5  2   
55.3%  7.9%  15.8%  13.2%  5.3%  97.4% 
 
5. Although I do not believe in God, I am open-minded about the mysteries of life. 
 13  12  7  2  3 
 34.2%  31.6%  18.4%  5.3%  7.9%  97.4% 
 
6. Part of me exists independently of my physical person. 
 1  3  1  3  30 
 2.6%  7.9%  2.6%  7.9%  78.9%  100% 
 
7. I engage in contemplative activities such as Yoga or meditation. 
 0  7  6  4  21 
 0%  18.4%  15.8%  10.5%  55.3%  100% 
 
8. I have found a way to come to terms with my existence, or lack thereof. 
 14  13  7  2  2 




Longitudinal Comparison of Beliefs From 1914-2007 
 
    1914  1933    1958  1958  2007 
 
n=    38  45  251  17  38 
 
Belief in God   13.2%  2%5  8%  6%  2.6%4 
Disbelief in God  80%2  87%  76%  —3  86.8%4 
No belief re: issue  6%2  11%  16%  —3  7.9%4 
 
Belief in immortality  8.8%  2%  8%  6%  0% 
Disbelief in immortality 63%2  79%  68%  —3  92.1% 
No belief re: issue  28%2  19%  24%  —3  7.9% 
 
Intense desire for immortality —3  —3  8%4  —3  10.5%4 
Moderate desire for immort. —3  —3  20%4  —3  15.8%4 
No desire for immortality —3  —3  56%4  —3  60.5%4 
===================================================================== 
 
1. In addition to providing limited specific information about the psychology members, Mayer (1959) 
published information about the 17 psychology respondents and 8 anthropology respondents 
combined together in this group of 25.  In 1958, there were 23 members of psychology section of the 
NAS, and 12 members of the anthropology section. Seventeen psychology members responded; 8 
anthropology members responded. The complete list of psychology members included F.A. Beach, 
E.G. Boring, Leonard Carmichael, Arnold Gesell, C.H. Graham, J.P. Guilford, H.F. Harlow, E.R. 
Hilgard, Heinrich Klüver, Wolfgang Köhler, K.S. Lashley, D.B. Lindsley, W.R. Miles, H.W. Nissen, 
W.B. Pillsbury, C.P. Richter, B.F. Skinner, K.W. Spence, S.S. Stevens, E.C. Tolman, Georg v. 
Békésy, E.G. Wever, and R.S. Woodworth; and the complete list of anthropology members included 
Clyde Kluckhohn, W.F. Albright, C.S. Coon, Emil W. Haury, A.V. Kidder, A.L. Kroeber, S.K. 
Lothrop, R.H. Lowie, H.L. Movius, Jr., H.L. Shapiro, Leslie Spier, and J.H. Steward (Proceedings of 
the National Academy of Sciences, 1957).   
2. These numbers are approximations based on Leuba’s charts (1916, p. 268). 
3. Leuba and Mayer provided neither numbers nor approximations for these. 
4. These numbers do not add up to 100%.  Some respondents did not check the box next to any of the 
statements. 
5. This number is stated by Leuba as 2% in his 1934 article (p. 296), but as 12% by Leuba in his 1950 
book, “The Reformation of the Churches” (p. 47).  It is also listed by Mayer (1959) as 12%, and by 





Belief in God 
 In 1998, Leuba’s questionnaire had been criticized for being too "ambiguous" and 
for its questions supposedly being designed "to ascertain belief not just in some sort of 
God, but a very specific kind of personal God" narrowly defined by Leuba in 1914 as “a 
God to whom one may pray in the expectation of receiving an answer” (Scott, 1998, p. 
25).    
 This study addressed such criticisms by adding a few relevant statements and 
asking the respondents whether they agreed or disagreed.  For example, the following 
statement was added: “The concept of God seems quite unnecessary."  55.3% of 
respondents "strongly agreed."  7.9% "somewhat agreed.”  Clearly, the majority of 
respondents not only expressed disbelief in the 1914 definition of God, but they found 
even the mere concept of God to be unnecessary. 
 In the margin next to this statement, respondent 04AD wrote, "It seems to be 
necessary for many others." 12AL  wrote, “I personally do not believe in God, but 
believe it is important for Society as a whole to believe in God.”  A couple of others 
wrote similar comments, such as, “Evidently some people have a psychological need for 
the concept of god.  I am uncertain as to whether this need can be fully addressed in other 
ways” (24AX).  These respondents clearly had indicated that they didn’t believe in God, 
but their comments suggest that they don’t mind other people having faith—and that it 
might even be a good thing. 
 One respondent (36BJ) wrote next to the statement, "unnecessary to whom?" 
 The one respondent who indicated a belief in God (with the caveat “when 
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desperate”) also noted, “When you are helpless and in mortal danger, you will always cry 
out to God for help.  Sometimes, when doing so, help comes!” (19AS)  He indicated a 
willingness to engage in a follow-up interview to discuss his religious and spiritual 
beliefs further.  However, the interview (Appendix S) ended very quickly.  I reviewed the 
general focus of the survey as being about the respondent’s belief in God or immortality, 
and he politely cut me off by saying, “I'm sorry, I don't have any beliefs that way, so you 
can just count me out of it.” That basically was the entire interview. 
 
Supernatural: Spirituality, mind-body problem, soul, non-physical existence 
 The theme of supernatural-ness is addressed here.  The respondents were 
universally skeptical of supernatural events or entities, or anything beyond nature.  The 
idea that there was natural “stuff” and supernatural “stuff” (a dualism, as 30BD calls it) 
did not seem to make sense to them personally.   If there was any question about the 
respondents’ naturalistic tendencies, consider their responses to this statement on the 
questionnaire: “Part of me exists independently of my physical person.”  78.9% “strongly 
disagreed.”  7.9% “somewhat disagreed.” 
30BD said, “I'm very much a determinist and a materialist” (lines 313-314).  He 
called this kind of dualism “unacceptable in the sense that there's absolutely no evidence 
for it” (lines 317-318).  He continued: “I'm not a religious person at all, as I think I 
indicated in the questionnaire.  I'm an atheist in sort of an outspoken way in the sense that 
I think so many of the world's problems today are coming from religious biases and 
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prejudices and things that eventually will pass from human culture, but probably not for a 
long time” (lines 339-342). 
 28BB stated, “It's hard for me to make any sense of the separate soul” (line 475).  
But he acknowledged that “a lot of people do have strong feelings of mysteries, 
strangeness, holiness, and so on, in certain situations in their lives that make a great 
impression on them.  And I have not myself had these kinds of mystical experiences, but 
I do believe the people who have had them” (lines 442-445).  This illustrated his lack of 
belief or any experience with anything supernatural, but he allowed that others might 
have had such experiences. 
 20AT made a comment on his questionnaire that many psychologists who are 
grappling with the issue of consciousness would appreciate: “Question 6 is a tricky one—
disagreeing with 6 doesn't entail disbelief in a spiritual side to humanity, any more than it 
entails disbelieving that we have minds.”  
“If you're referring to the mind-body problem,” stated 37BK, “no one's ever 
solved that.  Some scholars think they have, but I don't think they have.  I'm not sure I 
know.  We all experience.  And that's a different sort of mind stuff than the physical 
world, we think.  But is it really?  I don't really know.  And I don't know any way to find 
out” (Lines 43-46). 
 Indeed, both the “mind” and the “spirit” are quite intangible, hard to locate 





Spirituality: Desire for, opposition to, or neutrality with regard to it 
 Some of the respondents had desired experience with spirituality, transcendence, 
or an inner light.  Others opposed these things.  And still others seemed neutral or 
indifferent about them, simply claiming that they had never experienced such things. 
 Says 28BB: “When I was young, I used to hope I would have such experiences.  
But I guess why I hoped is because I thought it would be very interesting and I would 
become wiser because of it, etc.  But, in fact, I don't think I really did” (lines 629-635). 
 15AO said he “wouldn’t have been against having such an experience,” but 
transcendence and spirituality were simply not things he ever responded to (lines 1066-
1071). 
 Two respondents mentioned Quakers when the idea of spirituality came up:  
20AT stated that the questionnaire “didn't ask about belief in something like an ‘inner 
light’; [sic] I'm non-religious but if I were religious I'd be a Quaker, I think.”  Likewise 
with 37BK, who said, “I've never been there [experienced a higher plane of existence] 
(Line 62).... I attended Quaker meetings as an undergraduate because I admired the 
Quakers a great deal.  And I remember being excited at the beginnings of these hours of 
quiet... Everybody was telling me I would experience an inner light.  Well, I got to liking 
the meditation a lot and certainly my mind would wander and I found that interesting and 
the sessions seemed to get shorter and shorter, but I never had any inner light. (Lines 68-
72). 
Another respondent who simply did not respond to spirituality was 27BA:   
I was brought up by parents who were semi-active in a [protestant] church 
and who had me there every Sunday for the service and for the appropriate 
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level Sunday School. By the time I was an adolescent I was quietly (I am 
fairly shy) growing quite skeptical of the various things that they were 
attempting to drill into me, but I did not rebel until I went to college at age 
17 and delved quite heavily on my own into a good deal of secular 
philosophy. These ideas seemed more plausible to me, namely that we 
know about ourselves, the world, and the universe by study and 
observation, not by religious fiat. And with this perspective, I simply 
accepted my existence and that of others as having occurred and that one 
day it will cease; that I will no longer be. I simply do not see any reason to 
think that my "soul” or consciousness will outlast me or that it existed 
before I was conceived. Clearly, that is an hypothesis that I no more know 
how to prove than a more religious person does his or her hypotheses. 
Nonetheless, it underlies my approach to the world. (lines 869-881) 
 
Mysteries, uncertainties, ambivalences, paradoxes, unknowable things 
 The respondents had a great deal to say (or write) about what they didn’t know.   
In other words, there seemed to be a consensus that they didn’t know most things.   Some 
of them liked that; some of them seemed frustrated by it; and some simply seemed to take 
it in stride. 
Said 37BK: “I certainly wish there were more (mysteries) than there probably are.  
I love the idea of the unexpected and the surprising.  That's pretty typical in a scientist.  I 
guess I’m fundamentally an agnostic.  I believe there are things we cannot prove, and 
some of them are fascinating.  There are a great many mysteries about the world and 
about the lives we lead that I don’t believe we'll ever be able to prove.  I don't have any 
tools to do it with, that's for sure.  And so most of the time, I simply choose to live as if I 
understood more than I do. (Lines 7-13).... Basically I really do think most things are 
unknown.  And I think it's why I like science—that with a set of rules, we can at least 
establish certain things, if you buy into the set of rules” (lines 80-82).  In comments he 
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wrote on the questionnaire, he said, “I don't know how to prove or disprove the objective 
existence of value.  I choose to live consistent with what I understand to be ‘the good.’” 
 30BD stated, “There's obviously vastly more that we don't know than what we do 
know, and I think particularly with regard to cosmology, the origin of life, what the future 
holds” (lines 286-288).  Likewise, 27BA conceded that, “My answers are bound to be 
very superficial” (line 796) and he said there were an enormous number of scientific 
mysteries he didn’t have the answers to, but was curious about—and then he listed many 
of them (lines 819-847).  
28BB, speaking about mortality, said, “If you ask me, ‘Am I afraid to die?’ and I 
say, ‘No, let them come, I wave my sword, I am etc...’   That's a way of flattering 
oneself” (lines 537-546).  28BB was acknowledging, it seemed, that he didn’t know what 
death meant exactly—and that maybe if he was honest with himself it really worried him.  
However, he continued later:  
It turns out that for myself that I'm not in great difficulty about this point.  
I should be.  This will interest you.  I had a roommate in college whom I 
liked a lot, and he went off and served [in the military and in another 
profession.] We drifted apart, I haven't seen him for a long time, but I did 
sort of hear from him and also other friends... that maybe we should get in 
touch and each of us could share what we thought the meaning of life was.  
And I just didn't answer the letter.  And I probably wouldn’t answer it 
again.  But it seemed to me that the exchange showed that, for my friend, 
and some of his other friends spent a lot of time thinking about the 
meaning of life, like the folks do in William James' Variety of Religious 
Experience.  And one of the things about that book that rings true is that 
there is a whole lot of different kinds of religious experience.  There are 





Here, 28BB seemed to have expressed that he was not bothered by existential matters, but 
then on the other hand maybe he was.  There was an ambivalence on his part: he wanted 
to both acknowledge the mystery and also not acknowledge it. 
 This last illustration of not knowing is depicted not by the content of what the 
respondent said, per se, as much as the way in which he said it.  In the interview, I said to 
29BC, “There was also a question on the questionnaire that stated, ‘I desire personal 
immortality,’ and you checked, ‘not at all.’  That wasn't an uncommon response.  Uh, do 
you desire to be alive a year from now? 
29BC replied, “Sure.” 
I responded, “Yeah.  But one question I have is, if you desire being alive a year 
from now... but you think immortality is not something you desire, where in between 
those two is a target?” 
29BC immediately replied, “OK, immortality, I'd like immortality, sure” (lines 
971-981). 
 This last brief dialogue could be an example of the respondent not knowing 
something—and also not knowing that he didn’t know it.  Perhaps he still does not know 
it.  
 
Hard to know what immortality means 
 Zero percent of the respondents indicated on the questionnaire that they believed 
in immortality.  Nevertheless, more than 10% indicated that they desired it intensely.  
Several respondents were puzzled by the idea of immortality enough to spontaneously 
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comment on it.  21AU wrote, "How does one desire or not desire a state that does not 
exist and may not even make sense?"  37BK wrote, "I don't know enough about what 
'personal immortality' would involve to have an opinion."  Later, while being 
interviewed, he asked (apparently rhetorically), “Don't you think that immortality might 
get really boring?” (Line 22) 
27BA apparently strayed from the general arena of religion, spirituality, and 
existence, and stated (next to the statement about desiring immortality), “I hope that some 
of my intellectual contributions will be useful after I die.” 
 
Defining the self, identity 
 One of the statements on the questionnaire (#6) was, “Part of me exists 
independently of my physical person.”  Only approximately 10.5% of the respondents 
agreed with that statement.  What does it mean to say “me” or “I”?  How does one define 
oneself or another? 
Respondent 30BD stated that a person is certainly not defined by their DNA:  “I 
mean, that's not at all the case.  I mean, no geneticist would want to claim that. (lines 
304-305)  On the other hand, 28BB stated, “I got tired of hearing social psychologists 
claim that ‘the self’ is nothing but a social construct. (line 463) He was sure that it was 
much more complicated than that (line 471), and he gave many ideas about the fact that 
there is an enduring self (lines 642-680). 
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15AO said, “I believe that human beings have an identity, yes, in some informal 
sense.  If you next ask me what it means to have an identity, I will be unable to say 
anything intelligible” (lines 1049-1051) [emphasis added]. 
 
 
Reconciled with death/existence? 
 Statement #8 on the questionnaire was, “I have found a way to come to terms with 
my existence, or lack thereof.”  71% of respondents agreed with the statement; only 
approximately 10.6% disagreed with the statement.  Indeed, the general sentiment 
expressed by most of the respondents was consistent with what 36BJ said: “I am an 
atheist and I experience no conflict or doubts about my lack of belief in God or the 
afterlife.” 
 There were exceptions.  Respondent 28BB, after I mentioned that some of the 
respondents represented themselves as being quite nonchalant about death or 
nonexistence, said, “I think you are right to suspect the answers you get are not entirely 
truthful.  After all, if you ask me, ‘Am I afraid to die?’ and I say, ‘No, let them come, I 
wave my sword, I am... etc...’   That's a way of flattering oneself” (lines 537-546). 
15AO, also, stated “I am unreconciled to death” (line 1041).  It is notable that he 
used the preposition “to” rather than “with”—which made that expression of his 





What is most important, special, or how meaning is found. 
 The questionnaire did not specifically ask the respondents what was most 
important or special to them, or how they found meaning in their lives, so I inquired 
about these things during the follow-up interviews.  The respondents had much to say 
about this, and there was a great deal of variety in the responses. 
   
37BK expressed that doing good things for others, not hurting other people, 
raising his children to work hard and to respect others were important and good things.  
“Now, I can't prove any of that,” he said, “but I made a decision to choose to live as if I 
could” (lines 115-116). 
 Likewise, when 27BA was asked how his values were determined, said, “I do not 
really know” (line 917).  However, he found all of the following to be special or most 
important to him: “To be honorable to the extent that I am wise enough to be, to be 
moral, to be of some service to others such as my university, and to try to understand 
aspects of the world as filtered through my mind. Of course one's life has many more 
mundane pleasures such as enjoying aspects of art — paintings, plays, music, some 
cinema —; gardening; over the years knowing several [household pets] and becoming 
aware of their huge individual differences; excellent food and wine; and sensual 
pleasures. And these too are special to me, even if my esthetic tastes are not as cultivated 
as some people's” (lines 894-901). He also said he had found meaning “through deep 
personal relationships and via an active intellectual life based on study, theory generation, 
and empirical studies” (lines 888-889). 
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 Others were more concise and without hesitation said that what was most 
important to them was “seeking the truth” (30BD, line 343) or “social justice” (29BC, 
line 969). 
28BB stated, “At the moment, I have a wonderful relationship with a [romantic] 
friend of mine, that I've had now for [a number of] years, and I would say that was the 
most important thing at the moment.... I have a number of grown children, and they're 
important to me too.  But I have nothing unconventional here.  I guess, twenty or thirty 
years ago, I might have said, ‘It's really important to me to make a contribution to 
psychology and become famous and the like.’ I don't really say that kind of stuff 
anymore” (lines 587-596). 
 
Rationality 
 The respondents tended to find religion and spirituality to be irrational, and that 
made them particularly unappealing.  The respondents generally believed that they were 
rational people and that they valued being rational.  Respondent 37BK, for example, 
stated outright, “I think I'm a rational person (line 130).... We have to deal with what is” 
(lines 236-237).   
Likewise, 30BD stated, “The truth is to be found in as cool-headed an 
examination of reality as is possible.  It's not always possible, but that’s where good 
things come from, as opposed to bad things (lines 343-345).... I think the truth is, by 




On the other hand, 15AO said, “Well, most of human behavior is irrational, but 
there's a rational component” (lines 1056-1057).  When I asked if 15AO was suggesting 
there was a balance between being rational and being irrational, he said, “Well, it's not a 
balance.  There's nothing rational about, let us say, how you manage to breathe or send 
blood to your cells.  Most parts of the brain have no contact with what we think of as the 
conscious mind.  And all those parts are necessarily nonrational. And, of course, there are 
components of emotional life that are irrational as well.” (lines 1058-1063). 
It remains unclear whether the respondents valued rationality for its own sake 
(intrinsically) or as a tool for achieving something else—or both. 
 
Meditation, LSD, Club on the Head, Altered States 
 On the questionnaire, statement #7 gave the respondents an opportunity to 
indicate some engagement in non-Western spiritual practices.  Of the respondents, 18.4% 
indicated that they “somewhat agreed” that they engaged in contemplative activities such 
as Yoga or meditation.  04AD wrote next to the statement, "I do Tai Chi, for exercise."  
Otherwise, the respondents did not (via voluntary comments on the questionnaire) 
express any enthusiasm or participation in Eastern spirituality or other altered states of 
consciousness; the same can be said of those respondents who participated in follow-up 
interviews. 
37BK said, “I think there are a lot of things you can do to change personal 
consciousness—being hit with a club is one of them.  But, you know, LSD and mind-
altering drugs... I like what I've got well enough.  I don't want to mess around with it, so I 
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think that’s pretty silly.  You know, there are mystics who fast and have altered 
experiences as a result of it.  One could argue that it's all brain chemistry, but I don't think 
they can prove that either” (Lines 51-56). 
30BD clearly stated that he believed finding something spiritual through 
meditation or “dropping acid” was nonsense: “I think the truth is, by definition, 
articulable.  If it’s not articulable, it's nonsense… it's nonsense” (lines 354-355). 
 
Money 
 As of the writing of this dissertation, I have no evidence that any of the 
respondents kept or spent any of the money that was sent to them.  Appendix M shows 
that some of the respondents returned the money to me.   42BP and 52BZ both returned 
the two-dollar bills with notes declining to participate in the survey.  51BY returned the 
two-dollar bill and the questionnaire not completed.  04AD returned the two-dollar bill 
with the completed questionnaire and wrote, “I find it offensive to be sent money with 
this questionnaire. Please do not send the $20.”  25AY returned the $20.00 check with a 
note saying the money was unnecessary, but requested a summary of the study findings 
when available.  In a study of religion, it is not unreasonable to wonder whether or not a 
population perhaps worships money as some people apparently do.  There are no 







 This chapter discussed how and when the survey took place.  It presented the 
specific results of the participants’ responses to the questionnaire.  It also revealed, by 
presenting examples, the themes that were revealed in the respondents’ writings and 





Summary of the Main Findings: Answers to the Research Questions 
It is hard to imagine an elite group of scientists more inclined to rationalism and 
naturalism and less inclined to spirituality or religiosity than the population being 
surveyed in this project. The response rate was over 61%, and the results were clear-cut:  
Not one of the respondents expressed a belief in immortality, and only one person 
expressed a belief in God—and then only with this caveat: “when desperate.”  
Furthermore, that person, when approached in the follow-up interview (Appendix S) 
with regard to the his belief in God and immortality, said, “I’m sorry, I don’t have any 
beliefs that way, so you can just count me out of it” and then politely, but abruptly, ended 
the interview. 
The conclusion is that none—or very practically none—of eminent psychology 
scholars today believe in God and immortality.  Thus, the percentage of eminent 
psychology scholars who believe in God or immortality has necessarily decreased since 
1914. 
However, this study does not suggest that our eminent psychology scholars are, 
or should be, claiming the much-caricatured mantle of sarcastic, curmudgeonly atheism.  It 
cannot do that because the data do not support it:  Yes, some of the respondents may 
have indicated that most of the survey questions were “absurd” or that “religious beliefs 
are nonsense, and the sooner Homo sapiens moves on from these primitive beliefs, the 
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better.” Whatever their opinions, most of the NAS psychology members participated in 
the survey and all of the participants were unfailingly polite and civil in their responses to 
the survey. 
Furthermore, despite the very personal nature of the survey, the respondents’ 
candor seemed evident.  Several expressed an intense desire for immortality despite 
believing that it wasn’t possible.  One wrote, “When you are helpless and in mortal 
danger, you will always cry out to God for help.”  Another said, “I attended Quaker 
meetings as an undergraduate because I admired the Quakers a great deal… but I never had 
any inner light.”  Yet another conceded, “I wouldn’t have been against having [a spiritual 
or transcendental] experience, but I never did.” 
 Despite their apparent candor, a high response rate, and the opportunity to express 
alternative (or on-mainstream) religious or spiritual functioning or beliefs, the 
respondents generally seemed irreligious and non-spiritual even in alternative or Eastern 
manners.  Thus, the follow-up interviews were generally used to seek what was valued by 
the respondents, what was special or most important to them, how they defined their 
identities, how they found meaning in life, and what their feelings about mortality were. 
 With regard to the questions on Leuba’s original questionnaire, the numbers 
certainly do not give any reasonable indication that belief in God or immortality has 
increased among this population during the last 93 years.  As a matter of fact, of all the 
groups that have been surveyed using this questionnaire during the last 93 years, this is 
the first time that 0% of the respondents in a group expressed a belief in immortality. 
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 The common or recurring themes in the survey included the following: little 
interest in Yoga, meditation, LSD, fasting, contemplative practices, or Eastern spiritual 
practices; a particular appreciation for rationality; a variety of feelings about death and 
non-existence ranging from contentment to frustration to ambivalence; a generally 
accepted belief that there is an enduring self or identity, but that it is hard to define; a 
variety of feelings about immortality, including not knowing what it means, having an 
intense desire for it, having some desire for it, having no desire for it, or being ambivalent 
about it;  a variety of feelings about spirituality including openness to it, opposition to it, 
and neutrality with regard to it;  no strong beliefs that there is a soul or spirit, but some 
open-mindedness that having a “mind” is no more provable than is having a “spirit;” 
general (but not total) agreement that there are natural mysteries, uncertainties, 
ambivalences, paradoxes, disagreements, and unknowable things, and that curiosity about 
these things is common or central to their experience as scientists; and generally more 
often the finding of meaning in life not in abstractions, but in tangible day-to-day 
concrete experiences. 
 In the questionnaire and then the follow-up interview with 29BC, when he was 
confronted with the question of whether or not he truly desired immortality (lines 973-
981), he changed his mind.  It seemed that perhaps that dialogue was an example of the 
respondent not knowing something—and also not knowing that he didn’t know it.  
Perhaps he still does not know it.  
 This may have been an example of Hofstadter’s (1998) statement that, “All great 
science... is motivated by a fascination with mystery, and by that I do not mean the 
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clearing-up of mysteries, as in puzzle-solving.  I mean something more akin to the 
feelings of awe and strangeness that one has when confronted with inconceivables such 
as the vastness of the cosmos, the seemingly paradoxical constancy of the speed of light, 
the ethereality of the tiniest constituents of matter, or the shimmering between wave-
nature and particle-nature exhibited by those ghostly items” (p.512).  Perhaps the best 
way to understand the “religious” and “spiritual” characteristics of today’s eminent 
psychology scholars is to try to understand their awe and fascination, and how they 
grapple with the inconceivables, paradoxes, and ambivalences. 
 
Limitations and Opportunities of the Current Study 
 Perhaps the most substantial issue in this study is the question of how to deal with 
lies.  Respondents can engage in slight disingenuousness,  lack of candor,  outright 
deliberate fraud, or self-deception.  One respondent said that pursuing truth was one of 
the most important things to him (line 343), yet another conceded that perhaps he wasn’t 
telling the truth to me (lines 600-601).  The latter of these two stated that he had no 
interest in discussing the meaning of life with old friends when they had invited him to 
recently—and yet he willingly spent more time than any of the other respondents being 
interviewed by me about the meaning of life and related matters.  So did he want to 
discuss these meaning-of-life issues or did he not?  This is a concrete example of 
ambivalence or self-deception. 
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 Truth-telling—whether interpersonal or intrapersonal—is a complicated thing.  
As respondent 15AO stated, “most of human behavior is irrational” (line 1056).  Zilboorg 
(1943) stated,  
If this fear [of mortality] were as constantly conscious, we should be 
unable to function normally.  It must be properly repressed to keep us 
living with any modicum of comfort.  We know very well that to repress 
means more than to put away and to forget that which was put away and 
the place where we put it.  It means also to maintain a constant 
psychological effort to keep the lid on and inwardly never relax our 
watchfulness. (p. 467) 
 
What was I to do with a questionnaire returned by 26AZ, for example, in which 
the respondent marked that he “strongly disagreed” with all five of the statements #4 
through #8?  Not only was 26AZ the only respondent to “strongly disagree” with all five 
of the statements, but I wonder whether it is counterintuitive or disingenuous for a person 
with integrity to be able to strongly disagree with all five of those statements.  Were his 
responses valid? Did the respondent merely want the money that had been offered?  Did 
he just want me to stop sending him mail?  Perhaps his responses were valid. Maybe he 
was merely feeling particularly disagreeable that day when he received the questionnaire 
in the mail, and so his responses were honest. 
 Research workers who deal with interview data frequently are 
asked the question: ‘How do you know if the informant is telling the 
truth?’  If they are experienced research workers, they frequently push 
aside the question as one asked only by those unsophisticated in the ways 
of research.  But the persistence with which it comes up suggests that we 
take it seriously and try to formulate it in respectable terms. 
 Those who ask the question seem bothered by the insight that 
people sometimes say things for public consumption that they would not 
say in private.  And sometimes they behave in ways that seem to 
contradict or cast serious doubt on what they profess in open conversation.  
So the problem arises: Can you tell what a person really believes on the 
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basis of a few questions put to him in an interview?  Is this not a legitimate 
question? 
 The answer is, ‘No’—not as stated.  It assumes that there is 
invariably some basic underlying attitude or opinion that a person is firmly 
committed to, i.e., his real belief.  And it implies that if we can just 
develop shrewd enough interviewing techniques, we can make him ‘spill 
the beans’ and reveal what this basic attitude really is. 
 To begin with, we must constantly bear in mind that the statements 
an informant makes to an interviewer can vary from purely subjective 
statements (‘I feel terribly depressed after the accident’) to almost 
completely objective statements (‘The Buick swerved across the road into 
the other lane and hit the Ford head on’).  Many statements, of course, fall 
somewhere in between: ‘The driver of the Ford was driving badly because 
he had been drinking;’ or ‘It was the Ford driver’s fault because he was 
drunk.’ 
 In evaluating informants’ statements we do try to distinguish  the 
subjective and objective components.  But no matter how objective an 
informant seems to be, the research point of view is:  The informant’s 
statement represents merely the perception of the informant, filtered and 
modified by his cognitive and emotional reactions and reported through 
his personal verbal usages.  Thus we acknowledge initially that we are 
getting merely the informant’s picture of the world as he sees it.  And we 
are getting it only as he is willing to pass it on to us in this particular 
interview situation.  Under other circumstances the moves he reveals to us 
may be much different. (Dean & Whyte, 1958, p.34) 
 
Stated another way, “if someone is ‘not being completely candid,’ then that is 
her/his truth on that particular day in that particular situation” (Jones, K, personal 
communication, February 4, 2007).  So respondent 26AZ’s responses were his truth as 
expressed on that day in his particular situation.  This should come as no surprise to those 
familiar with Goffman’s (1959) claims that few of us are ever “completely” candid. 
 Even I, the principle investigator in this study, have scrutinized my behavior 
during the interviews as perhaps being too disingenuous, too accommodating, too much 
like a chameleon or a Zelig.  On the one hand, I seemed to agree with 37BK that “maybe 
there’s just the tension in life where we’d like to live a little longer, but we don’t want to 
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live forever” (lines 31-33).  On the other hand, in interviewing 28BB, I stated, “But it 
does puzzle me sometimes when I hear a scientific psychologist say, ‘No, I don’t want to 
live forever; that would be silly.’ And on the other hand, they do want to live a little bit 
longer than they are alive right now” (lines 516-518). 
 Consider, too, my seemingly agreeing with 37BK that being alive for three trillion 
years would probably get quite boring.  Actually, though, I can imagine some kind of 
cosmic asymptote of pure happiness, curiosity, joy, or contentment to which a person 
could, in theory, always (into eternity) be getting closer and closer. 
 I also wonder about my treatment of 29BC (lines 971-981).  Was it unfair to put 
the respondent on the spot and ask him when would be the ideal time for him to die?  It 
may very well have caught the respondent quite off guard or made him feel vulnerable or 
attacked.  On the other hand, he had volunteered for a follow-up interview.  And, more 
importantly, I was asking a legitimate question in the pursuit of truth.  Of the two people 
engaged in that conversation, only my identity will ever be known—no embarrassment or 
vulnerability related to his interaction will ever befall him. 
 Bleek (1987, p.314) said, “Survey research cannot handle delicate issues.... That 
an informant’s unwillingness to cooperate increases as the topic becomes more intimate 
and embarrassing goes without saying.... Interviewers who ask personal questions about 
delicate topics, sometimes with more sense of duty than common sense, force polite 
informants into lying ones.” 
 Bleek was wrong.  The current study has provided evidence that survey research 
can handle delicate issues.  However, this is probably more ably accomplished by a 
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researcher who is willing to be transparent, authentic, respectful, trustworthy, and 
courageous. 
The observation of the subject by the observer is complemented by the 
counter-observation of the observer by the subject. 
This insight forces us to abandon—at least in a naive sense—the 
notion that the basic operation in behavioral science is the observation of a 
subject by an observer.  We must substitute it for the notion that it is the 
analysis of the interaction between the two, in a situation where both are at 
once observers to themselves and subjects to the other.  However, even in 
that case, one must clarify logically the nature and locus of the partition 
between the two, because experimental attempts to create such partitions 
always miscarry, being both logically and practically self-defeating. 
(Devereux, 1967,  p. ) 
 
 The interviewee-interviewer relationship can be a peculiar one—with the 
alternating between the approach and avoidance, the parry and thrust, the suspicion and 
the trust.  I felt that the interview with 28BB was one of the more productive, in part 
because the respondent felt free to state outright that he could and might be lying to me.  
However, that freedom is also part of what  allowed him to reveal that he may have been 
flattering himself when he said he was not afraid to die (lines 545-546). 
 It is not so simple to identify which of these factors are limitations and which are 
opportunities for greater discovery.  If a networked computer had been used to conduct 
that particular interview with 28BB (in order to “protect” the respondent via a double-







Implications and Directions for Further Research 
 
The perfectly rational human? 
If, indeed, the individual does exist, then its desire to survive, reproduce, and have 
an identity apparently is so great that even the most rational (in terms of valuing 
rationality and being most able to engage in it) group of people have been shown in this 
study to have a lapse in their rationality—even in a formal survey from a research 
university!   
I would  expect to continue to see this lapse (e.g., fraud, self-deception) in many 
scientific endeavors.  Even in the world's most elite group of rational thinkers (about 
human beliefs and behavior), one person escaped this pure rationality at least 
momentarily.  That is the story here—that there was a breach in the rationality—not that 
practically none of the respondents believed in God or immortality. A tightly-coupled 
(not loosely-coupled) brain/mind—like a tightly-coupled nuclear reactor, as described by 
Scott (2002) —could be endangered by these lapses in rationality (or could endanger 
others).   
Bloustein (1972) states that, “the university is the place where reason resides.  It 
is, in fact, the institutionalization of reason.... The university exists to reason; reason is 
the very purpose of its being” (pp. 4-5).  That said, the implication of this study is that 
there will be lapses in the reasoning.  Even amongst the most elite group of rational 
thinkers, there was one who at least temporarily betrayed his rationality.  Perhaps it 
would behoove university administrators to step back and look for places within their 
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institutions where entities are too-tightly coupled, and to allow for the institutionalization 
of greater irrationality. 
 
A grand unifying theory of psychology without a grand unifying theory of physics? 
 The respondent 30BD, for example, stated clearly that he had a materialist and 
naturalist predilection.  For such people, it does seem that studying psychology is 
pointless without studying physics, chemistry, and cosmology.  Such sentiments lend 
credence to the increasing moves in the direction of interdisciplinary work.  
 
Formula for the most palatable time to die 
Is there a cognitive-emotional-biological formula for the most palatable time to 
die (MPTD)?  Kübler-Ross (1969) found that terminally-ill patients generally got to a 
point at which they accepted death.  A person who commits suicide—whether in solitude 
or by flying a plane into the World Trade Center—has, at least tentatively, apparently 
found his MPTD.  For many people, the MPTD is “never.”  The MPTD can apparently be 
influenced as was evidenced by Jim Jones getting his followers to drink poisoned Kool-
Aid, or by licensed professional counselors preventing or delaying the suicides of their 
clients.  Perhaps another environmental influence that can affect a person’s MPTD is the 
knowledge that his child will grow up or has grown up and achieved “success.”  
What is the formula?  This is a legitimate question with which the respondents 
fumbled around.  Most obviously,  respondent 29BC stated that he had no desire for 
immortality.  Then, he flip-flopped and stated that he did desire immortality (line 981). 
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Understanding the formula for a person’s, or a population’s, MPTD could be 
useful to the Department of Defense in manipulating other nation’s citizens, for the most 
efficient planning within the hospice care industry, or for adjusters who do actuarial 
work. 
 
Sharing raw data and errata, and not encouraging extraneous information 
 Numerous times in this paper, evidence has been presented of data that are 
incorrect, inaccurate, misleading, or disingenuous.  Even within the same articles, there 
are inconsistencies, sometimes outright sloppiness, and a casual refusal to share raw data.  
Leuba contradicts himself between his 1934 and 1950 works, with regard to some very 
basic numbers.   Leuba (1916) provides data in multiple formats scattered around the 
book in footnotes and tables and in the main text, so that it is extremely difficult to 
interpret his numbers.  Approximately half of the numbers in Larson and Witham’s 
Second Study were incorrect and no errata were ever published for them.  Although 
Eklund publicized her findings with regard to the religious beliefs of academics (Glenn, 
2005a; Glenn 2005b), she has not shared the specific survey questions she used (Eklund, 
personal communication, 2006).  Mayer (1959) grouped psychologists and 
anthropologists together, making it harder to understand the psychologists’ reported 
beliefs since only limited information about them specifically was provided. 
Hawkins (1999) showed that errors in published scientific research had been 
increasing at an exponential rate during the last approximately 40 years.  He indicated 
that the problem was continuing and getting even more severe.  Particularly with regard 
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to psychological research, the journal Nature has recently called for psychologists to be 
less reluctant to share their raw data (“A fair share,” 2006).  Wicherts (2006) made clear 
just how severe the problem was when he demonstrated the researchers’ hypocrisy and 
the poor availability of raw data.  In his study, he found that the vast majority of authors 
of research articles published in prominent psychology journals declined to share their 
data with him when he asked for it—despite the authors’ prior signed agreements to share 
the data. 
 In addition to these problems are policies by journals such as Nature (“Formatting 
guide,” 2007) that strongly encourage inclusion of “display items” (e.g., tables, photos, 
charts) with articles. There doesn’t seem to be this forceful request from American 
Psychological Association journals or Association of Psychological Sciences journals.  
The policy may make the pages of the journal look more aesthetically pleasing, but 
unfortunately it also forces authors to come up with “display items” that might be 
irrelevant, useless,  or counterintuitive.  It’s entirely plausible, too, that editors might 
create their own “display items” that do not accurately show authentic or true information 
about the authors’ articles.  For example, in the first Larson Study, a picture of a cross 
was included using halftones behind the text of the article, suggesting that Christians 
were the only religion that believed in God or immortality—provoking a letter to the 
editor (Baker, 1997).  This was apparently not Larson or Witham’s fault.  In Larson’s 
Second Study, the vast majority of the incorrect numbers were in the table; one must 
wonder if it was the editors who scrambled to put together a table to include—the article 
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was otherwise far more coherent and meaningful without the table with all its incorrect 
numbers.  
 
The relationship between religion and science 
The fact that one respondent did express a qualified belief in God will inevitably 
be interpreted in different ways by either school (or all schools) in a manner beneficial to 
its own interpretation/worldview.  Religious people may say that this is evidence that 
God is so powerful that He is keeping His foot in the door of even the most profanely 
rational communities. Scientists, on the other hand, may blame the lack of uniformity on a 
confounding variable, a God module in the brain, God gene, or perhaps a momentary 
misunderstanding.  This is further evidence that God-belief tends to seep or to pry into 
even the most rational people's minds.   
Respondent 19AS was one of the more remarkable respondents in that he 
expressed a qualified belief in God on the questionnaire and indicated a willingness to 
discuss his religious and spiritual beliefs further in an interview.  The brief interview 
(Appendix S), however, amounted to not much more than 19AS issuing a "non-denial 
denial" about religious belief (but certainly without stating 100% outright disbelief in 
God).  It seemed that he was attempting to believe in God and simultaneously to be a 
scientist, but that he was frustrated by the effort to reconcile the data with his desires.  




What would the average man do with a full consciousness of absurdity?  
He has fashioned his character for the precise purpose of putting it 
between himself and the facts of life; it is his special tour-de-force that 
allows him to ignore incongruities, to nourish himself on impossibilities, 
to thrive on blindness.  He accomplishes thereby a peculiarly human 
victory: the ability to be smug about terror.  Sartre has called man a 
‘useless passion’ because he is so hopelessly bungled, so deluded about 
his true condition.... Man uses his ideas for the defense of his existence, to 
frighten away reality.  This is a serious game, the defense of one’s 
existence—how take it away from people and leave them joyous? (Becker, 
1973, p.59) 
 
On the relationship between religion and science, Stark (1963) wrote the 
following: 
 The traditional argument that religion and science are incompatible 
perspectives is based on their contradictory evaluations of the authority of 
human reason.  Religion, because of its ultimate commitment to a non-
empirical system, must take the position that man’s reason is subordinate 
to faith as a means to truth.  From this view, reason is at best unreliable, 
and at worst, sinful pride.  Science, on the other hand, defines truth as that 
which may be demonstrated either logically or empirically, and thus opts 
for the supremacy of reason.  A middle-of-the-road attempt to resolve this 
conflict has been to argue that religious and scientific truths are different 
in kind, and hence accessible to different modes of knowing and subject to 
different criteria of validity.  But many modern philosophers have been 
loath to grant religion such a special dispensation from the canons of logic 
and evidence.  Indeed, such separation of truth into truths has recently 
been branded as ‘anti-intellectualism’ by Morton White.  Thus it appears 
that scientific scholars are as unwilling to admit religious modes of 
knowing as religionists are to submit their theology to scientific standards, 
and a crucial basis for conflict seems to remain. (p. 4) 
 
 Those words were written almost 45 years ago.  More recently, Brown (2003, 
p.614) quoted a passage from page 239 of Leuba’s 1916 book: 
 
Detailed acquaintance with the orderliness of physical nature dispossessed 
God of that realm.  Will not familiarity with mental and social laws 
dispossess him of the psychic world also?... For the psychologist the 
mental life is as completely within the realm of law as the physical; 
therefore, if the existence of law is a bar to God’s action, he is excluded 
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from intervening in the psychical life of man as well as in the physical 
universe. 
 
 In reaction to Leuba’s ideas, Brown (2003) wrote that “however much or little 
God may be seen as intervening in the physical world, it has been maintained with near 
unanimity that God can affect the mind or heart and that humans have free will in 
responding to such divine action” (p. 614).  Brown made this claim about  “near 
unanimity” without citing so much as a single reference—although he used many other 
references in that article.  It seems that it is just this kind lack of logic or reasoning that 
puts off the eminent psychologists.  Stark’s assessment of the situation seems correct in 
that the eminent psychologists seem befuddled by Brown’s illogic. 
 Generally speaking, the respondents in this study communicated beliefs that 
would not be consistent with Gould’s (1997) idea of “nonoverlapping magisteria” 
between the natural and the supernatural.  The reason the respondents were not 
comfortable with such an idea is that they didn’t even believe in the existence of anything 
supernatural to begin with, so whether or not it might overlap somehow with the natural 
world and natural laws seems to them to be nonsensical. 
 
Substantial nonverbal differences between religious people and scientists? 
Is it possible that the only difference between scientists and religious people is 
verbal?  Scientists call existence "nature;" religious people call it "creation." Scientists go 
to university commencements and baccalaureate ceremonies that seem very much like 
church services.  Respondent 30BD said, “I don't think anybody takes their academic 
robes as seriously as people would take their religious robes” (lines 408-409); however, is 
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that hypothesis testable?  Scientists are rational and irrational; religious people are 
rational and irrational.  Scientists and religious people are arguably similar or practically 
identical in nonverbal communication:  Both live next-door to each other, eat similar 
food, perform various necessary bodily functions, value their friends, lovers, and 
children, want good things to happen in the world, and value social justice.  When the 
interviewees in this project were asked what was special or most important to them, they 
described interests and pursuits that seem common among the most religious people in 
our society. 
 
The “two cultures” of psychology 
As described in Chapter Two, there are (at least) “two cultures” of psychology.  
These have been described in many different ways.  It would seem that the cultures are 
not evenly represented in the psychology section of the NAS.  Respondent 30BD even 
stated, “I suspect you’ll get a softer, more spiritual set of answers from psychologists than 
if you asked biologists or certainly physicists or chemists” (lines 379-381).  If the 
clinical, “romantic,” or post-positivistic psychologists, for example, were better 
represented in the NAS, then the responses in this survey would likely have been 
different.  These respondents certainly do not represent all psychologists. 
It would be useful to elucidate the “two cultures” of psychology further.   How do 
they relate?  How do they interact?  Where do they overlap?  Part of the 
operationalization in this study included identifying “eminent psychologists” as the 
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psychology members in the NAS.  Perhaps a future study could define eminent 
psychologists in a different way. 
 
Individual human existence 
I suspect future generations of NAS psychology members might be more 
forthcoming with regard to individual human existence.  They might be more inclined to 
admit, as some psychologists already have, that the individual human doesn’t exist 
(Blackmore, 2006).   
30BD referred to Richard Dawkins with regard to religion, but not with regard to 
the least common denominator of living things—the essence of the human individual—
which is something Dawkins (1976) has commented on and would be relevant to the 
question of the existence of the human individual.  Although 30BD did not make that 
connection, he did make it clear that he was a materialist and a determinist (lines 313-
314) and that he found any kind of dualism between the mind and body, or mind and 
soul, to be “unacceptable” (lines 317-318).  He stated that he had thought hard about 
these issues (line 311), and he expressed certainty (lines 304-305) that the human being is 
not just its DNA.  However, he did not offer a definition for the human individual. 
One respondent (15AO) said he thought the individual existed and had some kind 
of informal identity, but he conceded, “If you... ask me what it means to have an identity, 
I will be unable to say anything intelligible” (lines 1049-1051).  Another respondent 
(29BC) stated, “I don't think I have a view on it” (line 996) with regard to the existence 
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of the individual.  These comments seem odd, given that the field of psychology rests on 
the presumption that the individual human being exists.  
How can scientists study something they can’t define—especially if they can’t 
define it in a precise and accurate manner?  How can an entity be said to have religious or 
spiritual beliefs if that entity does not exist or if its essence is in question?  How can we 
define the individual in light of the fact that most of the cells in its body have DNA 
different than its own, that hundreds of different species live within the person and keep it 
alive, that monozygotic twins, triplets, and quadruplets are considered to be distinct 
persons, that suprachiasmatic nuclei can be transplanted, that mirror neurons exist, that 
phantom limbs seem to exist,  or that a mother often feels that her child is part of her? 
This is a critical issue that will deserve more attention. 
 
Summary 
 This chapter summarized the findings of this study, the answers it provided to the 
research questions, the limitations of the study, and the opportunities presented by the 
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November 14, 2006 
 
Dr. Eminent Psychologist 
State University 
New York, NY 10016 
 
Dear Dr. Scientist: 
 
I respectfully request your participation in a survey of eminent psychologists' religious and spiritual beliefs.  
This study replicates a survey initially administered ninety-two years ago by Dr. James H. Leuba of Bryn 
Mawr College's psychology department.  His study revealed that members of different scientific disciplines 
held strikingly different attitudes about religion.  Although his study has been replicated several times since 
then, none of the replications since 1958 have included psychologists. 
 
The purpose of this study is twofold: to gauge the extent to which eminent psychologists' beliefs about God 
and immortality may have changed during the last ninety-two years, and to begin to understand the 
characteristics of the spiritual or religious beliefs of contemporary eminent psychologists.  To these ends, I 
am using Dr. Leuba's original questionnaire as well as a brief, additional qualitative component. 
 
The enclosed one-page questionnaire is being sent to the sixty-two members of the National Academy of 
Sciences in the psychology section.  I hope you will complete the questionnaire and return it.  Your 
participation will be invaluable.  Each respondent will receive a completed version of the study. 
 
Each questionnaire is coded only so that I will be able to know whom to contact for unreturned 
questionnaires.  Your responses to the questionnaire will be kept completely confidential and will not be 
revealed to anyone.  I will take particular care to obscure individuals' information.  
 





Matthew W. Pappas 
Doctoral Candidate 
Department of Educational Administration 










P.S.  •The risk associated with this study is no greater than everyday life. 
        •There are no benefits for participation in this study. 
        •The enclosed questionnaire can be completed within a few minutes. 








 Make a check to the right of each statement true for you.     
  
1. Concerning the belief in God: 
 a. I believe in a God to whom one may pray in the expectation of receiving an answer.  By                  
     "answer," I mean more than the subjective, psychological effect of prayer.  
 b. I do not believe in God as defined above  
 c. I have no definite belief regarding this question  
 
2. Concerning the belief in personal immortality, i.e., the belief in continuation of a person after death in 
    another world: 
 
      personal immortality for all people.  
 a. I believe in     conditional immortality, i.e., immortality for those who have 
     reached a certain state of development.  
 
b. I believe neither in conditional nor in unconditional immortality of the person in another 
     world.  
 
 c. I have no definite belief regarding this question.  
 
 intensely    
3. I desire personal immortality moderately  
       not at all     
 
 
Please indicate your degree of agreement or disagreement with the following statements by marking one: 
Strongly Agree – Agree Somewhat – Neither Agree Nor Disagree – Somewhat Disagree – Strongly Disagree 
 A                           a         ?   d  D 
 
4. The idea of God seems quite unnecessary. 
    A            a           ?            d            D 
 
5. Although I do not believe in God, I am open-minded about the mysteries of life. 
    A            a           ?            d            D 
 
6. Part of me exists independently of my physical person. 
    A            a           ?            d            D 
 
7. I engage in contemplative activities such as Yoga or meditation. 
    A            a           ?            d            D 
 
8. I have found a way to come to terms with my existence, or lack thereof. 




9. If the above statements did not adequately represent your viewpoint, please characterize your spiritual 
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Appendix M:  Questionnaire timeline and responses 
 
 
2006 November 17:  Questionnaire was mailed with first letter (Appendix E). 
2006 November 28:  Reminder postcard (Appendix H) was mailed. 
2006 December 13:  Questionnaire was mailed with second letter (Appendix I). 
2007 January 17:  Questionnaire was mailed with third letter (Appendix J), two-dollar 
bill, and postcard-size note (Appendix K). 
 
Each respondent who returned a completed questionnaire either received a confirmation 
letter (Appendix L) or was contacted at least once if they had indicated a willingness to 
be interviewed. 
 
Each respondent whose questionnaire was returned after 2006 January 17 was mailed a 
confirmation letter (Appendix L) and a check for $20.00 (except for 04AD who explicitly 






















9: I think deism (belief in Gods & spiritual afterlife) is a pernicious delusion. 
Additional comments: 
On #5, respondent circled the phrase "the mysteries of life" and wrote next to it, "Such as 
what?  The cause of genetic birth defects?" 
On #6, respondent circled the word "exists" and wrote in the margin, 




































































9: I find it offensive to be sent money with this questionnaire. 
Please do not send the $20. 
Additional comments: 
In the margin next to statement #4, respondent wrote, "It seems to be necessary for many 
others." 
In the margin next to statement #7, respondent wrote, "I do Tai Chi, for exercise." 














































































































In the margin next to #3, respondent wrote, "(though I recognize that immortality in 































































9: I personally do not believe in God, but believe it is important for Society as a whole to 


























































































































































9: When you are helpless and in mortal danger, you will always cry out to God for help.  
Sometimes, when doing so, help comes! 
Additional comments: 
At the end of the first sentence of #1.a., respondent inserted the words, "when desperate." 
In the margin next to #2.a., respondent wrote "neither." 






















9: You didn't ask about belief in something like an "inner light"; 
I'm non-religious but if I were religious I'd be a Quaker, I think. 
Question 6 is a tricky one—disagreeing with 6 doesn't entail disbelief in a spiritual side to 
humanity, any more than it entails disbelieving that we have minds. 
Additional comments: 
In the response to #9, respondent underlined the word "were" in the phrase, "but if I were 






















In the margin next to #3, respondent wrote, "? how does one desire or not desire a state 
that does not exist and may not even make sense?" 
In the margin next to #5, respondent wrote, "? as in, I trust in science?" 
























In the margin next to #3, respondent wrote, "not relevant—since I don't believe in it." 











































9: Q4: Evidently some people have a psychological need for the concept of god.  I am 























Respondent kept the $2.  Respondent returned the $20 check with a note saying the 











































9: Question 3 is too narrow.  I hope that some of my intellectual contributions will be 
useful after I die. 
Additional comments: 












































9: Like most NAS members, I am an atheist and find most of the above questions absurd. 
Additional comments: 




















9: Richard Dawkins has said it eloquently.  Religious beliefs are nonsense, and the sooner 
Homo sapiens moves on from these primitive beliefs, the better. 
Additional comments: 



































































































































9: I am an atheist and I experience no conflict or doubts about my lack of belief in God or 
the afterlife. 
Additional comments: 




















9: Interesting survey!  I don't know how to prove or disprove the objective existence of 
value.  I choose to live consistent with what I understand to be "the good." 
Additional comments: 
In the margin next to #3, respondent wrote, "I don't know enough about what 'personal 
immortality' would involve to have an opinion." 






















9: Understanding the natural world does not, in my view, require any assumption about 
there being an omnipotent god.  Nature is wonderful enough without resorting to 
superstiition and magic.  The idea of immortality may give comfort to some (or many) 
but it is supported only by faith.  Our existence is subject to the laws of nature—in 
particular, neuroscience. 
Additional comments: 








































































Received: No. Respondent returned questionnaire not completed, along with $2 and a 
























































Interview — Respondent: 37BK 1 
 2 
M:  On the questionnaire, there was a question that said, “Although I do not believe in 3 
God, I am open-minded about the mysteries of life.” I'm curious about what kind of 4 
mysteries do you imagine or you expect there might be?" 5 
 6 
R: Well, put it this way.  I certainly wish there were more than there probably are.  I love 7 
the idea of the unexpected and the surprising.  That's pretty typical in a scientist.  I guess 8 
I’m fundamentally an agnostic.  I believe there are things we cannot prove, and some of 9 
them are fascinating.  There are a great many mysteries about the world and about the 10 
lives we lead that I don’t believe we'll ever be able to prove.  I don't have any tools to do 11 
it with, that's for sure.  And so most of the time, I simply choose to live as if I understood 12 
more than I do.  I guess that's the easiest way to say it. 13 
 14 
M:  I've got to tell you that so far, the first couple of questions on this questionnaire, 15 
there's been a consensus in the people who’ve returned it so far, with regard to... none of 16 
the respondents have said they believe in God or immortality, and yet there are a few who 17 
have said they desire immortality intensely or somewhat.  I think maybe you're the only 18 
one who didn't even answer that question.  You wrote something on the side indicating 19 
that it's hard to even know what immortality means. 20 
 21 




M:  Yeah, after three trillion years, what are you going to do? 24 
 25 
R:  Hah!  I actually am a science fiction fan and that is a current theme in science fiction.  26 
And a lot of authors have treated it, and generally nobody seems really enthusiastic about 27 
immortality once they get there... with maybe the exception of an author named van Vogt 28 
who seems to like it. 29 
 30 
M:  So I don't know if there's a... it's one of those things where maybe there's just the 31 
tension in life where we'd like to live a little longer, but we don't want to live forever.  32 
Something like that? 33 
 34 
R:  That actually sums it up pretty well. 35 
 36 
M:  I've got another question.  I had another question on this questionnaire where you 37 
answered that you neither agreed nor disagreed with.  The statement was, "Part of me 38 
exists independently of my physical person."  And I don't know if I wrote that question, 39 
or statement, badly, or if you didn't know whether you thought part of you exists 40 
independently of your physical person.  And could you elaborate? 41 
 42 
R:  If you're referring to the mind-body problem, no one's ever solved that.  Some 43 
scholars think they have, but I don't think they have.  I'm not sure I know.  We all 44 
experience.  And that's a different sort of mind stuff than the physical world, we think.  45 
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But is it really?  I don't really know.  And I don't know any way to find out. 46 
 47 
M:  Do you put any stock in the people who use LSD or meditation or something like that 48 
to explore this kind of personal consciousness versus universal consciousness? 49 
 50 
R:  Well, I think there are a lot of things you can do to change personal consciousness—51 
being hit with a club is one of them.  But, you know, LSD and mind-altering drugs... I 52 
like what I've got well enough.  I don't want to mess around with it, so I think that’s 53 
pretty silly.  You know, there are mystics who fast and have altered experiences as a 54 
result of it.  One could argue that it's all brain chemistry, but I don't think they can prove 55 
that either.  Certainly, in our daily lives, we have a lot of experience that tells us that you 56 
can certainly mess up consciousness in a lot of ways. 57 
 58 
M:  Right, right. 59 
 60 
R:  And whether or not the people who think they are achieving some higher plain of 61 
existence are doing that or really getting there, I just don't know.  I've never been there, 62 
so I don't even have a personal experience that I can refer to. 63 
 64 
M:  One of the questions on the questionnaire was with regard to whether you had 65 




R:  I attended Quaker meetings as an undergraduate because I admired the Quakers a 68 
great deal.  And I remember being excited at the beginnings of these hours of quiet... 69 
Everybody was telling me I would experience an inner light.  Well, I got to liking the 70 
meditation a lot and certainly my mind would wander and I found that interesting and the 71 
sessions seemed to get shorter and shorter, but I never had any inner light.  The other 72 
people around me seemed to.... [garbled recording]... That's probably the closest I've ever 73 
gotten to meditation, although I have let colleagues who thought they were studying 74 
hypnosis try to hypnotize me, and that's a kind of meditation.  I think it's kind of 75 
interesting. 76 
 77 
M:  It's an unknown, I guess. 78 
 79 
R:  Yes.  As you can see, basically I really do think most things are unknown.  And I 80 
think it's why I like science—that with a set of rules, we can at least establish certain 81 
things, if you buy into the set of rules.  Of course, you don't have to do that either. 82 
 83 
M:  So we can know some things, but not a whole lot. 84 
 85 
R:  Well, you can reason within a system, if you set up the rules. But, you know, other 86 
than that, the only reason we sort of accept logic is because we all sort of agree on the 87 




M:  Do you find that, within your field, or within psychology in general, or within your 90 
particular area, that you are disagreeing with your colleagues about those basic rules of 91 
science or logic? 92 
 93 
R:  You know, that's interesting.  I can answer that at two levels. The answer is yes, 94 
because my profession is characterized by finding different ways to look at things and 95 
coming to the conclusion that my colleagues are wrong about the way they do it—96 
particularly [respondent’s subfield of psychology].  On the other hand, one could argue 97 
that we’re operating within the same rule set... it's just that I'm better at it than they are.  98 
Now, of course, they would conclude they’re better at it than I am [laughs].  The history's 99 
going to have to decide.  So I would say, do I ever challenge the fundamental rules? 100 
Probably not, because I think that most of what I believe can be pretty well demonstrated 101 
within those rules.  And when I disagree with others, it's my impression that they're not 102 
following the rules. But again, that's pretty subjective. 103 
 104 
M:  Do you feel that basically there is an agreement somehow that rationality is valued 105 
for its own sake or... or just as a tool?  I don’t know how to phrase the question exactly, 106 
but it's kind of going down that alley, I'm not sure. 107 
 108 
R:  It's some.  I certainly prefer what I perceive to be a rational life.  And I don't like 109 
people who seem to behave what looks like irrationally to me.  Although sometimes it 110 
turns out that they have their own reasons and that they were rational within their world.  111 
 
 126 
It just seems to me... I do very much value the experience of good and bad.  And I think 112 
some things are bad.  I think hurting people is bad.  And I think doing nice things for 113 
people is good.  I think raising your kids, you know, to work hard and have respect for 114 
others is good.  Now, I can't prove any of that, but I made a decision to choose to live as 115 
if I could.  And I'm going to live according to those rules whether I can prove them or 116 
not.  [A social psychologist who studies moral behavior once commented] about people 117 
who seemed to set out to do evil.  He said they don't... that in his view, everybody thinks 118 
they're doing good, they just redefine the world they live in.  You see, it's an interesting 119 
thing.  You know, you wonder, did Hitler get up and say, "I'm really going to do 120 
something rotten today."  Or did he manage to convince himself that what he was doing 121 
was somehow for the greater good, in his view?  I mean, it's kind of scary that the latter 122 
might be true.   123 
 124 
M:  Along those lines, maybe this is redundant... you say you prefer a rational life, but 125 
even though that's what you state that you prefer, I'm going to ask anyway if you think 126 
maybe that you are basically rational or basically irrational?  I know you stated what you 127 
prefer, but... 128 
 129 
R:  I think I'm a rational person. 130 
 131 




R:  Yes. 134 
 135 
M:  Yes.  Ok, what is most important or special to you? 136 
 137 
R:  Are you going to give me some choices or...? 138 
 139 
M:  Oh, no, it's open-ended.  This is an open-ended part.  This is because I don't know.  140 
Uhh... you know, there are people who if they were religious, they might say, "Of course, 141 
Jesus is most important to me.... or there's this particular value... or my children... or 142 
whatever...."  So this is why I ask.  Or being rational might be most important.  I don't 143 
know. 144 
 145 
R:  I'm not sure what rationality is, but I wouldn't pick an abstract value like that over 146 
doing good for people.  I mean, I want good things for my children.  I want them to be 147 
healthy.  I don't want them to be hurt by anybody.  And I'd like to think that I'm a person 148 
who doesn't hurt other people.  I think that's probably most important to me.  ... And then 149 
you have to be a reviewer for journals [laughter] and then you have to hurt people 150 
[laughter].... I don’t like doing that.  That's very hard for me. 151 
 152 
M:  Yeah, that's just one of the chores like serving on committees and so forth. 153 
 154 




M:  Well.... 157 
 158 
R:  You're really doing interesting work.  What is your long-term interest?  What would 159 
you like to do once you get out of school? 160 
 161 
M:  I teach psychology at a community college here while I am working on my Ph.D.  162 
I'm doing my dissertation right now—that's why I’m doing this.  And I'm in the College 163 
of Education, Department of Educational Administration.  And if I had my druthers, I 164 
would just be a healthy person with a little family and a couple of dogs living on a farm. 165 
 166 
R: [laughter] 167 
 168 
M:  But the reality is, I'll probably keep... I would like to continue to do some sort of 169 
research and ideally teach one class per semester for the rest of my life.  One I like, but 170 
more than that is work.  That's where I am. 171 
 172 
R:  That sounds like a wonderful life. 173 
 174 
M:  Well, it's what I've chosen and I don't know if I would choose anything else.  So 175 




R:  Well, I really wish you well.  I hope it works. 178 
 179 
M:  Thank you.  I'll tell you the truth, there are many more questions I could ask you, but 180 
I don't want to hold you forever and I’m trying to figure out.... you've gotten to the core 181 
of some of these issues, and it's hard to ask any kind of questions related to this stuff.  I 182 
mean, it's difficult.  I don't know if I could ask you one more thing? 183 
 184 
R:  Sure. 185 
 186 
M:  I don't know if you remember the questionnaire, or after just having this discussion 187 
on the phone, if there is a question that you think should have been included—or some 188 
perspective—you think would have been worth asking to the respondent? 189 
 190 
R:  I assume that you’re doing this as a follow-up to something that was done earlier.  I 191 
mean, are you comparing changes in psychological attitudes over time? 192 
 193 
M:  That's true. 194 
 195 
R:  What was the most interesting thing in the earlier studies that you found? 196 
 197 
M:  The earliest one—it was done almost a hundred years ago—he used not just people in 198 
psychology, but historians and chemists and biologists and mathematicians, and what he 199 
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found was that the psychologists had the greatest percentage who did not believe in God 200 
or immortality.  And that they also had the highest response rate. That occurs in other 201 
studies as well, probably because the psychologists have done it themselves and they 202 
want people to respond to their own surveys, so they do it themselves.  But, uh, with 203 
regard to the one I sent out, I added some questions to that original questionnaire and I 204 
have not gotten a consensus on any of them from the respondents.  So there are some 205 
respondents who say, "No, I don’t think the idea of God is useful," and other say, "Yes, I 206 
don’t believe in God, but it's good for society."  There are some who have engaged in 207 
some sort of meditation, and others who say absolutely not.  And so on and so forth.  I 208 
don't know. 209 
 210 
R:  It sounds like you're facing the fact that we live in a more complicated, more varied 211 
world now.  And people have an opportunity to get exposed to a lot of different ideas.  212 
And probably we're a heterogeneous society compared to the society the way it was when 213 
the earlier studies were done. 214 
 215 
M:  There might have been minorities, with regard to different beliefs around the country.  216 
But now it's much more evident that there are people who have very different beliefs.  I 217 
don't know how it’s going to turn out. 218 
 219 
R:  It's a fascinating enterprise.  I certainly hope it turns into a wonderful paper.  I'll look 220 




M:  I'm satisfied with the conversation with you.  I really appreciate you talking with me. 223 
 224 
R:  Certainly.  Well, I think what you're doing is a worthy thing to do.  It's nice to study 225 
ourselves. 226 
 227 
M:  I'm glad you think that, and you're not the first person that I’m following up with, but 228 
I know there are respondents, or those who might have responded, who were concerned 229 
about the ongoing conflict in our society between science and religion—and they're afraid 230 
of having this project be used to make it look bad for people in psychology—that they're 231 
anti-religion or that the evangelicals will get mad and take money away from their 232 
studies. 233 
 234 
R:  There was an associate dean at Yale that said something one day that I really loved.  235 
[….] He said, "Facts are friendly."  That's a wonderful idea.  We have to deal with what 236 
is. 237 
 238 
M:  That's what scientists do, is look at the data.  And whatever the data say, that's what 239 
we have to deal with. 240 
 241 
R:  I hope you got enough responses to get a good paper out of it, because I think it's a 242 




M:  Thank you.  Thank you very much.  If there are any other questions you might have 245 
for me, I'd be glad to try to answer them. 246 
 247 
R: Sure, why don't you give me your phone number? 248 
 249 
M:  I'll give you my cell phone number.  It's 512-[…].  250 
 251 






Appendix O: 255 
Interview — Respondent: 30BD 256 
 257 
 258 
M:  One of the statements on the questionnaire that you filled out was, "Although I do not 259 
believe in God, I am open-minded about the mysteries of life."  And you agreed strongly 260 
with that.  I'm curious about what kind of mysteries you imagine or you think you might 261 
find. 262 
 263 
R:  Well, just the obvious that... First of all, let me ask you, I mean, what department are 264 
you in and in sort of what field is this being carried forward. 265 
 266 
M:  And please do ask any other questions you might have, but I teach psychology at the 267 
local community college here at Austin Community College, but I am working on my 268 
dissertation for my Ph.D. at the University of Texas in the College of Education in the 269 
Department of Educational Administration.  So, my dissertation is a little bit out there for 270 
my department, but that's what I'm doing. 271 
 272 
R:  And what's the gist of the dissertation, the title of the dissertation?  I'm just curious. 273 
 274 
M:  I ought to remember the title of the dissertation, but it’s basically looking at the 275 
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spiritual and religious attitudes of eminent psychologists in the United States.  It's a 276 
replication.  There was a study done almost a hundred years ago by another psychology 277 
professor, and then another one done about fifty years ago by someone who’s still living 278 
over in California.  His name is Ronald Mayer.  So it’s been replicated before, but not 279 
with psychologists in almost fifty years, so the first part of this survey was identical to 280 
what was used almost a hundred years ago, and then I followed up with some other stuff. 281 
 282 
R:  OK.  That's fine.  I just sort of wanted to know where you’re coming from, so that 283 
gives me a good idea.  So your question was, how do I define the mysteries?  I guess in a 284 
very conventional way from the point of view of, I guess, most scientists, or a lot of 285 
scientists.  I mean, there's obviously vastly more that we don't know than what we do 286 
know, and I think particularly with regard to cosmology, the origin of life, what the future 287 
holds, those are the mysteries that immediately come to mind as conventional ones that 288 
most people would admit we simply don't know the answers to, and those answers are 289 
going to be remarkable ones if any of us are around to understand them at some distant 290 
time in the future. 291 
 292 
M:  You mentioned cosmology.  Do you find, as the years go by, that you are more 293 
involved with people in other disciplines, or less involved, in trying to understand things? 294 
 295 
R:  I would say no more or less.  I'm an inquisitive person who’s always interested in the 296 




M:  There was one more statement I wanted to follow up with, from the questionnaire, 299 
which was, "Part of me exists independently of my physical person."  And you said no, 300 
you disagreed with that.  Have you settled, just as a practical matter on seeing a person as 301 
being defined by their DNA or do you go beyond that to... 302 
 303 
R:  Certainly not their DNA.  I mean, that's not at all the case.  I mean, no geneticist 304 
would want to claim that. 305 
 306 
M:  How would you define... or would you be able to identify that boundary between the 307 
individual and the environment?  Is it an easy thing or, as a practical matter, do you deal 308 
with that much? 309 
 310 
R:  Well, for many years, I was [in a subfield of biology], so I thought long and hard 311 
about the nature-nurture kinds of issues.  But I’m not sure what the focus of the question 312 
is.  I think, you know, to put it in a nutshell, I'm very much a determinist and a 313 
materialist.  And if by those pejorative terms, one simply means somebody who doesn't 314 
believe there's anything beyond physics, chemistry, and biology, you know, and what 315 
human beings are.  The alternative to that is, which few people I think these days would 316 
agree with if they thought about it, is a kind of dualism which is unacceptable in the sense 317 
that there's absolutely no evidence for it. So, yes, I guess you'd say I'm a materialist or a 318 




M:  You used the word "pejorative" yourself.  Do you feel that’s our culture imposing 321 
itself? 322 
 323 
R:  Yes. 324 
 325 
M:  Scientists, I think, might not say those are pejorative to be materialists or naturalists 326 
or whatever. 327 
 328 
R:  I think they might not, but broadly speaking, most people will consider those not 329 
terms that they want to apply to themselves. Scientists, I don't know how the percentages 330 
would break down, but certainly some substantial fraction would consider themselves in 331 
that same camp, but I know many others who wouldn't. 332 
 333 
M:  Right.  I wonder if you could tell me what do you find most important, or special, to 334 
you?  I know that's a very open-ended question.... Some people who might be religious 335 
might automatically say, well, Jesus is most important to me... or I can imagine a scientist 336 
saying that, well, being rational is most important to me. 337 
 338 
R:  I'm not a religious person at all, as I think I indicated in the questionnaire.  I'm an 339 
atheist in sort of an outspoken way in the sense that I think so many of the world's 340 
problems today are coming from religious biases and prejudices and things that 341 
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eventually will pass from human culture, but probably not for a long time.  So, I mean, 342 
what I find most important is certainly seeking the truth, but I would say the truth is to be 343 
found in as cool-headed an examination of reality as is possible.  It's not always possible, 344 
but that’s where good things come from, as opposed to bad things. 345 
 346 
M:  Have you ever had an experience of finding the truth, or truth—capital "T" or lower-347 
case "t" or whatever—through some method that might be inarticulable? 348 
 349 
R:   No.  No. 350 
 351 
M:  No? 352 
 353 
R:  No.  I think the truth is, by definition, articulable.  If it’s not articulable, it's 354 
nonsense… it's nonsense. 355 
 356 
M:  I read every once in a while about people who through meditation or through 357 
dropping acid or whatever... 358 
 359 
R:  That sort of thing is nonsense as far as I'm concerned. 360 
 361 




R:  I do recall it, but not in detail. 364 
 365 
M:  Sure, that's OK.  I understand, because that was last month....Well, are there any 366 
questions that you feel might have been appropriate on a questionnaire or that I, within 367 
this context, might have asked you or might have asked the respondents? 368 
 369 
R:  Well, I think your project is an interesting one, and of course I'm interested in the 370 
outcome.  You know, I don't have a very high opinion—or as high of an opinion, I 371 
guess—of psychologists or the field of psychology.  I'm basically not a psychologist; I’m 372 
really [in a subfield of biology and have] come lately to do things that have typically been 373 
the province of psychology, but I don't have a very high opinion of either the history or 374 
the methodology or the insights of psychology.  Obviously, there are many, many 375 
exceptions to that sort of statement, but compared to physics, chemistry, the biological 376 
sciences, I think, psychology has lagged behind in its insights and worldview.  I'm saying 377 
that because I think I have a much better sense of what biologists and how they would 378 
answer the questions that you asked than how psychologists would answer them.  So I 379 
suspect you’ll get a softer, more spiritual set of answers from psychologists than if you 380 
asked biologists or certainly physicists or chemists, but I’d be interested to know that.  381 
No, there are no special questions. But I get a lot of questionnaires and I throw most of 382 
them in the trashcan.  I answered yours because it seemed interesting. 383 
 384 




R:  And I'm interested in what you come up with for your thesis, but I guess I wouldn't be 387 
enormously optimistic that you'll get uniform rationality from people. 388 
 389 
M:  I can tell you, since you seem interested, that I'm either at fifty percent now or I'm 390 
one short of fifty percent in the response rate.  And there's a consensus with regard to the 391 
early questions in the questionnaire about... there's no one who has stated that they 392 
believe in God or immortality.  But then in the following questions, there is not a 393 
consensus, and those are questions with regard to whether God is a necessary or useful 394 
concept, or whether people engage in meditation or yoga, or these various things.  And so 395 
there’s not consensus, and I'm exploring that. 396 
 397 
R:  Yes. 398 
 399 
M:  But as I look back—I've been in college a while, but I haven’t been an academic 400 
nearly as long as you or any of my respondents—and I see behavior of academics—all of 401 
us, really—certain behaviors that seem religious.  For example, the commencement or 402 
baccalaureate ceremonies that can look like a church service, even at a secular school. 403 
 404 
R:  Well, sure, there is certainly a grey zone where symbolism and tradition and 405 
conventional ways of doing things are carried forward, not because anybody takes them 406 
terribly seriously, but because it adds a certain grace and aura to the enterprise of 407 
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academic progress and accomplishments for students, but I don't think anybody takes 408 
their academic robes as seriously as people would take their religious robes, for example. 409 
 410 
M:  Yeah. 411 
 412 
R:  As a matter of fact, I think most people consider it sort of a joke, but it's a joke they're 413 
willing to go along with because it has a certain value for the participants—the younger 414 
participants, anyway. 415 
 416 
M:  Yeah, for frankly the fundraisers and so forth. 417 
 418 
R:  Sure. 419 
 420 
M:  Yeah.  Well, I could go on and on, but I feel like basically you’ve communicated to 421 
me how you feel about these things, and I really appreciate your help. 422 
 423 
R:  OK.  Well, good luck with your project, and I'd be interested to see the final product. 424 
 425 
M:  Thank you.  Thank you so much. 426 
 427 








Appendix P: 431 
Interview — Respondent: 28BB 432 
 433 
 434 
M:  One of the statements on the questionnaire was, "Although I do not believe in God, I 435 
am open-minded about the mysteries of life." And you said you somewhat agree. 436 
 437 
R:  Yes. 438 
 439 
M:  I'm wondering what mysteries of life do you imagine that there might be. 440 
 441 
R:  Well, a lot of people do have strong feelings of mysteries, strangeness, holiness, and 442 
so on, in certain situations in their lives that make a great impression on them.  And I 443 
have not myself had these kinds of mystical experiences, but I do believe the people who 444 
have had them.  And so... 445 
 446 
M:  It sounds like... do you hope that you would have those experiences, or not?  Is it 447 
something that you seek, or not? 448 
 449 
R:  I don't believe so.  There's a certain sense in which everything you don't do is a loss.  450 
And there are lots of things I haven't done that I wish I had done.  But these religious or 451 




M:  Another one of the statements on the questionnaire said, "Part of me exists 454 
independently of my physical person."  You had an answer that was very common: you 455 
disagreed strongly.  But I wonder, how do you define yourself?  How do you define a 456 
person?  Or how do you define yourself in particular, in light of the existence of mirror 457 
neurons, or the fact that we have these hundreds of different species of bacteria in our 458 
digestive tract, or the fact that there are identical twins who we consider to be distinct 459 
people.  How do you define yourself?  Or do you feel like you can do it beyond just a 460 
conventional way? 461 
 462 
R: [….]  I got tired of hearing social psychologists claim that "the self" is nothing but a 463 
social construct.  And this seemed to me rather too broad a claim, so I thought through 464 
about the self-perception and these other things I've mentioned to you. 465 
 466 
M:  So it sounds like you felt the social psychologists had oversimplified it. 467 
 468 
R: Yes. 469 
 470 
M:  That it was much more complicated.  And I guess it goes without saying that you also 471 
would feel that more religious people are oversimplifying by saying that there's a soul 472 




R:  Yeah, well, it's hard for me to make any sense of the separate soul.   475 
 476 
M:  Yeah. 477 
 478 
R:  People do have—again, to harken back to what we were saying a few minutes ago—479 
people do have experiences that seem to them very important, that are not based on 480 
immediate perception or on the body. And you've kind of got to respect that experience.  481 
And I think talking about the soul, as one begins to think about certain matters, one needs 482 
a term that reflects somehow this special inner state and how different it is from ordinary 483 
life, and that's, I guess, what you called "soul."  But it's not just that not everybody 484 
believes in the soul, but there are whole cultures where it doesn't quite come up. 485 
 486 
M:  Right.  Well, there was another statement on the questionnaire that has to do with... it 487 
said, "I have found a way to come to terms with my existence, or lack thereof."  And you 488 
said you somewhat disagree.  And I wonder, is that something you have struggled or 489 
hoped for, to find a way to come to terms with? 490 
 491 
R:  Well, I'm not sure what that notion, "come to terms" is that the question uses.  It 492 
might be construed to mean that "I used to object to death, but I don't object anymore." 493 
 494 




R: I meant that perhaps that's what your question meant.  Could you read me that 497 
question again? 498 
 499 
M:  Yes.  The statement was, "I have found a way to come to terms with my existence, or 500 
lack thereof." 501 
 502 
R:  Yeah.  Well, it sounds to me—although I'm not certain what the sentence means—but 503 
perhaps by coming to terms with the lack of my existence, that seems to suggest that I'm 504 
supposed to no longer complain about the fact I'll be dead by and by.  Maybe that's not 505 
how you meant the question, but that seemed to be a possible interpretation.  "Come to 506 
terms with."  People use that phrase "come to terms with" when they want to say, "I'm not 507 
going to fight this anymore." 508 
 509 
M:  Sure. 510 
 511 
R:  Perhaps I misunderstood the question though... in which case, try me again. 512 
 513 
M:  No, that sounds right.  Although I am kind of posing these things open-endedly so 514 
that I can go into this thinking that there are things that I'm going to learn from you.  So 515 
it's not a yes-or-no question.  But it does puzzle me sometimes when I hear a scientific 516 
psychologist say, "No, I don't want to live forever; that would be silly."  And on the other 517 




R: [laughter]  I've noticed that, too, about myself. 520 
 521 
M:  So, where to draw the line? 522 
 523 
R:  Well observed. 524 
 525 
M:  I don't know.  And we scientists... it seems like we try to define things and be 526 
accurate and precise and draw the line, and so I don't know where we're trying to do that. 527 
 528 
R:  Well, let's go back to the beginning of this question again. Uh... you just said, as a 529 
scientist, something about we are expected to mind or, I forget exactly how you phrased 530 
it. 531 
 532 
M: [laughter] I don't remember what I said either. 533 
 534 
R:  We'll start again then. 535 
 536 
M:  But I have, in this survey and before... have heard psychologists—scientific 537 
psychologists, I might say—say that they don't.... They seem nonchalant about— 538 
 539 




M:  "Immortality, that's no big deal.  I don't want to live forever. That's crazy." 542 
 543 
R:  Good question.  And I think you are right to suspect the answers you get are not 544 
entirely truthful.  After all, if you ask me, "Am I afraid to die?" and I say, "No, let them 545 
come, I wave my sword, I am etc..."   That's a way of flattering oneself. 546 
 547 
M:  Mmm-hmm. 548 
 549 
R:  It's not how everybody thinks.  It's not even how all psychologists think.  It may not 550 
even be how the person who expresses this response, thinks.  I know I've done this 551 
myself.  And I guess I did a lot more when I was younger... young and brave and strong 552 
and so forth.  Now, I'm sort of puttering along here with [a neurological disorder].  It's 553 
not so obvious about whether I mind or not. 554 
 555 
M:  Right. 556 
 557 
R:  Many of these questions do come up, and they come up when you're drawing up your 558 
living wills and all that kind of stuff.  559 
 560 




R:  And so you mustn't take for granted that any particular answer you get on these 563 
comments is true or valid.  They may not be.  They may just be faking. 564 
 565 
M:  Yeah.  It is a given that... I don't know, perhaps you know someone who doesn't lie to 566 
themselves [sic] at least occasionally, but I don’t know if I do. 567 
 568 
R:  Uh-huh. 569 
 570 
M:  And so I keep that in mind.  Nevertheless, there must be some presumption of 571 
honesty or truth, rather, in the communication between humans, I guess. 572 
 573 
R:  Well, it depends upon the situation.  And I don't know that there needs to be a 574 
presumption... If you ask me what the weather is like up here, and I tell you it's been a 575 
beautiful day, and there's a presumption of honesty, so you assume probably it was a 576 
beautiful day.  But maybe I was just being impatient of your question and wanted to get it 577 
over with and go on to the next one. 578 
 579 
M:  Sure, sure.  Yeah.  All right, well, that sounds like a good segue. I’ll move on to 580 
another question:  What is most important to you?  Or what is special to you? 581 
 582 




M:  It is very broad, isn't it? 585 
 586 
R:  At the moment, I have a wonderful relationship with a [romantic] friend of mine, that 587 
I've had now for [a number] years, and I would say that was the most important thing at 588 
the moment.  589 
 590 
M:  Yeah. 591 
 592 
R:  Except I have a number of grown children, and they're important to me too.  But I 593 
have nothing unconventional here.  I guess, twenty or thirty years ago, I might have said, 594 
"It's really important to me to make a contribution to psychology and become famous and 595 
the like.” I don't really say that kind of stuff anymore.  596 
 597 
M:  Mm-hmm. 598 
 599 
R:  I'm not entirely sure what the right answer is.  Perhaps I'm not telling you the truth 600 
now. 601 
 602 
M:  Yeah. 603 
 604 




M:  Yes.  I know I am asking very personal questions. 607 
 608 
R:  Well, it's all right, because I don't have to give you honest answers.  But more to the 609 
point, really, is that we don't know each other...  610 
 611 
M: Yes. 612 
 613 
R:  And that is sort of protective of this relationship.  But I certainly haven't told you 614 
anything that I would mind anybody knowing.  So I have a lover and I have children, so 615 
what else is new? 616 
 617 
M:  Yeah, yeah.  As I talk to you right now, I am realizing—and this isn’t the first time, 618 
but I'm wondering how I will obscure this information that we've discussed […] and so 619 
forth.  I'm not sure how I'm going to handle that, because this is supposed to be—and it is 620 
what I've guaranteed—that it would be anonymous. 621 
 622 
R:  Tell me, how did you get to me in the first place?  Was this a random selection? 623 
 624 
M: No, no it's not.  Because you're one of the National Academy of Sciences members in 625 
the psychology section.  That's the same group that was used almost fifty years ago.  And 626 
a similar group was used almost a hundred years ago, with the same questionnaire.  I've 627 
just extended it a little bit to pose some questions that seemed to make more sense, at 628 
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least to me, for today.  So... Have you ever had an experience that was some sort of 629 
communion with the infinite or universal consciousness or transcendence or something 630 
like that? 631 
 632 
R:  I don't think so.  When I was young, I used to hope I would have such experiences.  633 
But I guess why I hoped is because I thought it would be very interesting and I would 634 
become wiser because of it, etc.  But, in fact, I don't think I really did. 635 
 636 
M:  You were saying earlier that you used to desire some sort of fame and that now what 637 
is special to you is your personal relationships. Do you feel like that's a change for the 638 
better, or that it's just part of maturation?  Do you feel like you are the same person that 639 
[you were] thirty years ago?  Or are you a different and distinct person? 640 
 641 
R:  Well, I don't know exactly what those questions mean.  One is often confronted with 642 
questions of that sort.  "Are you the same person as before?"  [….]  If you ask me, “Are 643 
you the same person that you used to be?" I think I can give a pretty good answer, "Yes." 644 
Because the memories I'm laying down now are continuous with and dependent upon the 645 
ones I already have. Several years ago, I went with my friend to [a particular 646 
geographical tourist destination], a glorious place in [a particular country], and now I'm a 647 
person who's been to [that place].  And that's something to be!  I'm glad I didn't miss it.   648 
 649 




R:  On the other hand, I'm not such a different person as to be confused about the whole 652 
thing.  Am I going in the right direction here? 653 
 654 
M:  I'm not looking for a particular answer.  I'm curious. 655 
 656 
R:  Yeah, you're not, but the question is obviously looking for something.  And I'm 657 
groping again with this, OK, am I the same person? 658 
 659 
M:  Well, for example, you mentioned one of the sources of self-knowledge is private 660 
self.  Do you feel like your private self is the same now as it was twenty years ago? 661 
 662 
R:  Yes, it is not as much different as I had expected it to be.  You know, I am now in my 663 
[…] seventies.  And uh.... 664 
 665 
M:  But your perceptual self—I assume, because you mentioned [the neurological 666 
disorder]—maybe you do notice that being different? 667 
 668 
R:  Well, maybe, but perception is a pretty reliable source of information about what's 669 
really happening.  But... uh... Am I the same person?... I guess there's just no one answer 670 
for that.  Uh, suppose you consider an amnesic for a moment (That's not me.  I don't have 671 
amnesia.  I may get it next week, but I don't have it now.)Suppose I was an amnesic and I 672 
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had forgotten large parts about my life, and I don't remember my youth or my education 673 
because I’d forgotten all that stuff.  Am I the same person as before I forgot it?  Well, 674 
there it turns out that there's actually a little bit of data, collected by my [associate. He] 675 
collected some data from amnesics, and it turns out that even people who have amnesia 676 
and don't remember large chunks of their actual life, nevertheless there's a sense in which 677 
they're the same person as before.  Their friends notice this.  The friends of amnesics are 678 
fond of telling investigators, "He's the same person.  I recognize the way he laughs, the 679 
jokes he tells, the way he goes, the ways he walks. It's him, no matter what he 680 
remembers."  That's really interesting talk, it seems to me, but it leaves one at a loss as to 681 
how to answer the question you asked me. 682 
 683 
M:  Yeah. 684 
 685 
R:  It's a harder question than you thought, isn't it? 686 
 687 
M:  I've been continually challenged by this, so I don't know the answers to these.  I have 688 
a hard time just asking the questions. 689 
 690 
R:  Yeah.  Great. 691 
 692 
M:  And I don't know what else to ask you.  If you were in my shoes and you were 693 
putting together that questionnaire and making this call, is there a question that you feel 694 
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should have been asked to the respondent, that was not asked?  Do you think there's one 695 
that’s particularly relevant? 696 
 697 
R:  I'm still unclear about what motivates your questionnaire.  Early on in our 698 
conversation this afternoon, I thought that it had maybe a lot to do with religion, that 699 
maybe you were especially interested in people’s religions, at least about God, 700 
expectations about the afterlife, that sort of stuff.  But as our conversation went on, it 701 
seemed that you were not limited by that—and maybe not even all that interested in it, 702 
because you started asking me a lot of other questions.  And now I feel I don't quite know 703 
what your purpose really was, and therefore I don't know how I could've helped you 704 
more. 705 
 706 
M:  That's similar to just the basic issue of how to find meaning in life.  Because what's 707 
the answer to that?  I'm not sure.  This project is defined as finding what the spiritual and 708 
religious attitudes of psychologists are, and yet I did not want to—and I still do not want 709 
to—control where you go with these ideas.  And so if you had started talking about God 710 
and Jesus and you're a Mormon or a Presbyterian or whatever, then I would have gone 711 
with that, because I want to find out what you think.  And so that's what I'm trying to go 712 
along with, and explore that. 713 
 714 
R:  That's very good.  I'm encouraged to hear that, in certain ways. I could easily imagine 715 
a questionnaire that was built primarily around notions of conventional religion and if I 716 
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was a Methodist or whatever.  And if you had asked me that, I would have, in the first 717 
place, lost interest in the questionnaire soon—my responses would be a little aggravated, 718 
you know... "Well, what makes you think that that's the most important thing?"  You've 719 
avoided that problem by leaving it open to what the most important things are, but 720 
unfortunately when you leave these problems open as wide as that, it's hard to make 721 
sense of what comes through. 722 
 723 
M:  Right, right.  I am asking you to—I don't know—maybe create what is this reality, 724 
what is your—even though we're not calling it religion—what is special to you. 725 
 726 
R:  It may be special to me, but I've never thought that this is the big, big question.  I 727 
mean, the way you phrased it a few minutes ago, about the meaning of life.  It's such a 728 
cliché, the meaning of life, that Monty Python can make a movie about it.  And, uh, so 729 
when you ask somebody, "What do you think the meaning of life is?" you kind of can’t 730 
get anywhere with that. 731 
 732 
M:  That's the way you feel. 733 
 734 
R:  Well, no, that's the way I feel on your behalf.  I don't think that with a questionnaire 735 
of this rigid a form you're going to get an answer to how do people get the meaning of 736 
life.  It turns out that for myself that I'm not in great difficulty about this point.  I should 737 
be.  This will interest you.  I had a roommate in college whom I liked a lot, and he went 738 
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off and served [in the military and in another profession.] We drifted apart, I haven't seen 739 
him for a long time, but I did sort of hear from him and also other friends... that maybe 740 
we should get in touch and each of us could share what we thought the meaning of life 741 
was.  And I just didn't answer the letter.  And I probably wouldn’t answer it again.  But it 742 
seemed to me that the exchange showed that, for my friend, and some of his other friends 743 
spent a lot of time thinking about the meaning of life, like the folks do in William James' 744 
"Variety of Religious Experience."  And one of the things about that book that rings true 745 
is that there is a whole lot of different kinds of religious experience.  There are varieties.  746 
And one of those varieties is not to be so bothered by it. 747 
 748 
M:  Yeah. 749 
 750 
R:  Well [chuckle] maybe I've said all I can say usefully. 751 
 752 
M:  [laughter] Yeah.  Would you at least agree that it's possible to not be bothered by it, 753 
but to still be curious about it and to have dialogues about it? 754 
 755 
R:  Yeah. 756 
 757 
M:  All right. Well, that's kind of what we've done. 758 
 759 




M:  I probably could ask questions on and on and on, but basically I think I understand 762 
what you're getting at, and I really appreciate your contributing to this, and I guess we 763 
can end it there. 764 
 765 
R:  OK.  I look forward to receiving, if you write something up, send it to me. 766 
 767 
M:  I plan to.  With regard to this particular interview, I am not sure how I'm going to 768 
obscure some of this personal stuff, but I will find a way to do it, so... 769 
 770 
R:  OK. 771 
 772 
M:  OK. 773 
 774 
R:  Have good luck with it. 775 
 776 
M:  Thank you very much. 777 
 778 
R:  Happy New Year. 779 
 780 




Appendix Q: 782 





Subject: Re: Religious attitudes questionnaire follow-up 788 
 789 
Dear Mr. Pappas, 790 
 791 
I'll do my best to write reasonably clear, brief answers to your questions. But let me 792 
say at the onset, the formulation of some of them seem deeply influenced by a 793 
religious perspective, which, of course, I do not share. Also, each one is the sort of 794 
question that many people have spent a lifetime studying and writing long tomes. So 795 




At 06:35 PM 12/21/2006, you wrote: 800 
 801 




Thank you for completing the religious attitudes questionnaire and for expressing a 804 
willingness to be interviewed via email.  Please know that if you reply to this or any 805 
follow-up messages that your replies will be kept completely confidential.  Furthermore, 806 
any personally identifying information you might provide will be edited sufficiently to 807 
obscure your identity. 808 
 809 
I am not looking for any particular answers, and I understand if you choose to skip any 810 
questions.  Your candid responses—either succinct or verbose—and continued 811 
participation are greatly appreciated. 812 
 813 
First, please expound on a few of your questionnaire answers.  You indicated that you are 814 




One mystery is very old and, indeed, and still far from resolved: the mind/body 819 
problem. How do the electro/chemical activities of billions of neurons seem to give 820 
rise to our sense of consciousness? There are now many cognitive psychologists who 821 
are convinced that developments in brain imaging will ultimately lead to its 822 
resolution, but I am not yet convinced. It's a very long leap from where we are now. 823 




A closely related question is what other animals also have something like our 826 
consciousness? And how can we know that using scientifically sound methods? This 827 
problem is very subtle. For example, some observers think that dolphins 828 
communicate among themselves in a more complex way than merely signals for 829 
danger, food, sex, which are fairly common to a lot of species. Yet we have not, to 830 
my knowledge, managed to crack the code of their messages. Yet we somehow think 831 
that if there is extra-terrestrial life we know how to detect meaningful signals. 832 
 833 
But beyond life itself, there is the vast mystery of universe itself— its nature, 834 
dimensionality, whether there really are elementary particles, the nature and 835 
relations among the forces, the ultimate laws and their degrees of invariance over 836 
time, what led to the big bang?, and of course many biological issues beyond the 837 
mind/body problem, etc, etc. Basically, everything that we know of as science and 838 
where it is going. It has been and is a major social adventure, for good or ill. 839 
Increasingly, I fear for ill. When and how will the human species go extinct? 840 
 841 
And, of course, there are exceeding complex issues about the nature of social 842 
structures, their evolution, their dangers — topics of the whole of social science — 843 
and the question of whether gaining such knowledge we permit us to learn how not 844 
to try forcibly try [sic] to impose our views on others. None of us should be so 845 
convinced that we know the truth and insist that others agree. Yet quite regularly 846 





You indicated that you believe no part of you exists independently of your physical 850 




My environment, which includes both animate and inanimate aspects, impinges 855 
upon my sense organs, and outputs from my body impinge on my environment. 856 
Sometimes the intervening activity between the input and output is conscious, but 857 
most of the time a great deal of it is not conscious (e.g., walking itself as distinct 858 
from the goal of getting somewhere). I'm not really sure what you mean by to 859 
"identify the boundary between you and your environment". 860 
 861 
I'm sure that philosophers would see my views as highly simplistic. But these are the 862 
thoughts that immediately spring to mind. 863 
 864 
You agreed "somewhat" that you had found a way to come to terms with your existence, 865 
or lack thereof.  Can you describe how you've done that? 866 
 867 
 868 
I was brought up by parents who were semi-active in a [protestant] church and who 869 
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had me there every Sunday for the service and for the appropriate level Sunday 870 
School. By the time I was an adolescent I was quietly (I am fairly shy) growing quite 871 
skeptical of the various things that they were attempting to drill into me, but I did 872 
not rebel until I went to college at age 17 and delved quite heavily on my own into a 873 
good deal of secular philosophy. These ideas seemed more plausible to me, namely 874 
that we know about ourselves, the world, and the universe by study and 875 
observation, not by religious fiat. And with this perspective, I simply accepted my 876 
existence and that of others as having occurred and that one day it will cease; that I 877 
will no longer be. I simply do not see any reason to think that my "soul” or 878 
consciousness will outlast me or that it existed before I was conceived. Clearly, that 879 
is an hypothesis that I no more know how to prove than a more religious person 880 
does his or her hypotheses. Nonetheless, it underlies my approach to the world. 881 
 882 
Below are several related questions: 883 
 884 
How have you found meaning? 885 
 886 
 887 
Through deep personal relationships and via an active intellectual life based on 888 
study, theory generation, and empirical studies. 889 
 890 





To be honorable to the extent that I am wise enough to be, to be moral, to be of some 894 
service to others such as my university, and to try to understand aspects of the 895 
world as filtered through my mind. Of course one's life has many more mundane 896 
pleasures such as enjoying aspects of art — paintings, plays, music, some cinema —; 897 
gardening; over the years knowing several [household pets] and becoming aware of 898 
their huge individual differences; excellent food and wine; and sensual pleasures. 899 
And these too are special to me, even if my esthetic tastes are not as cultivated as 900 
some people's. 901 
 902 
Why do you get out of bed in the morning? 903 
 904 
 905 
Because I wake up, usually quite early, wanting to do various things that, of course, 906 
vary from day to day, year to year, and decade to decade. I look forward to what 907 
comes my way and what I can do to advance our understanding of a small aspect of 908 
this remarkable world in which we live. 909 
 910 





I have no real idea. Presumably, they have been learned both via what I have 914 
experienced and what my understanding, which surely is very imperfect, of what 915 
others have experienced and feel. Some would attribute that mostly to parents and 916 
aspects of upbringing but what all the other factors are, I do not really know. 917 
 918 
Have you ever experienced a communion with the infinite, or universal consciousness, or 919 
some other transcendence, whether articulable or not? 920 
 921 
 922 
Either it goes on most of the time or I haven't experience such an event at all. I need 923 
more precise definitions. 924 
 925 
 926 
Do you believe there is ultimately more than one absolute?  If so, can you describe them? 927 
 928 
 929 
I'm not at all sure what an "absolute" is. It sounds more like an adjective rather 930 
than a noun. 931 
 932 
Finally, what question do you think should have been asked here or on the initial 933 





I haven't a clue; it really depends up the goals of your study. 937 
 938 
Thank you for your patience in waiting for me to get back to you:  I just yesterday 939 
received the IRB approval to follow up with this email. If you have any questions for me, 940 




Matthew Pappas 945 
Doctoral candidate 946 





Appendix R: 949 
Interview — Respondent: 29BC 950 
 951 
M:  There was a question on the questionnaire—I was using a Likert scale on this—that 952 
said, "Although I do not believe in God, I am open-minded about the mysteries of life."  953 
You did not answer that, and I was curious... was that because you didn't like the word 954 
"mysteries" because it suggested something supernatural... 955 
 956 
R:  Yes, I think that's right.  I wasn't sure what was meant by "mysteries." 957 
 958 
M:  That doesn't surprise me.  May I ask you, since this was a questionnaire about 959 
immortality and existence and so forth, what is most important or special to you?  And, of 960 
course, I want to remind you that the confidentiality continues from the questionnaire on 961 
through this interview, and of course it's anonymous on your part, and so on. 962 
 963 
R:  I wasn't sure what the question meant... "important"... Do you mean like, uh... value in 964 
life? 965 
 966 
M:  I suppose so.  What makes you want to get out of bed in the morning? 967 
 968 




M:  Social justice.... There was also a question on the questionnaire that stated, "I desire 971 
personal immortality," and you checked, "not at all."  That wasn't an uncommon 972 
response.  Uh, do you desire to be alive a year from now?   973 
 974 
R:  Sure. 975 
 976 
M:  Yeah.  But one question I have is, if you desire being alive a year from now—and 977 
that's not unusual for us—but you think immortality is not something you desire, where 978 
in between those two is a target? 979 
 980 
R:  OK, immortality, I'd like immortality, sure. 981 
 982 
M:  OK.  That's a tough one.  I'm not sure what you'd do after a few billion years, but.... I 983 
guess there's only one more question that I’d appreciate you answering, unless there's 984 
something else you want to say... 985 
 986 
R:  Sure. 987 
 988 
M:  There are some people in psychology who have argued about how to define the 989 
individual human being.  Do you feel that you have gotten to an answer?  What is 990 
essentially the individual?  And do you feel like you've found an answer to that or... I 991 
know there are some people who go to another extreme and say, No, we don't exist—that 992 
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this is just a convention to say that the individual exists and as a practical matter we use 993 
that.  Where do you see yourself on that? 994 
 995 
R:  I don't think I have a view on it. 996 
 997 
M:  OK.  Like I said, I really appreciate your time. 998 
 999 
R:  Sure. 1000 
 1001 
M:  If there's a question you might have, I'd be glad to try to answer it any way I can.  1002 
And otherwise, that's it. 1003 
 1004 
R:  No, that's OK. 1005 
 1006 
M:  Thank you so much. 1007 
 1008 
R:  OK. 1009 
 1010 




Appendix S: 1012 
Interview — Respondent: 19AS 1013 
 1014 
 1015 
M:  The questionnaire was with regard to the respondents' belief in God and immortality 1016 
and related... 1017 
 1018 
R:  I'm sorry, I don't have any beliefs that way, so you can just count me out of it. 1019 
 1020 
M:  Oh. 1021 
 1022 
R:  Sorry. 1023 
 1024 




Appendix T: 1026 
Interview — Respondent: 15AO 1027 
 1028 
 1029 
M:  There was one statement in the questionnaire in which you, like some other people, 1030 
marked the statement that "I desire immortality intensely."  As I said, you weren't the 1031 
only one.   1032 
 1033 
R:  Yes.  It would be nice, right? 1034 
 1035 
M:  Yes.  There was also another statement that you marked that you agreed with that 1036 
said, "I have found a way to come to terms with my existence, or lack thereof."  And, like 1037 
I said, the confidentiality continues, and I know these are personal questions.  And I’m 1038 
wondering how, or if you can articulate how you have come to terms with your existence. 1039 
 1040 
R:  I don't even know what I meant by saying that since I am unreconciled to death. 1041 
 1042 
M:  Yeah, unreconciled.  OK... well, if you are unreconciled with death, how about this.... 1043 
I know that there are a lot of psychologists, or at least some, who have gained some 1044 
notoriety, who say that not only do we cease to exist, but we don't even exist in the first 1045 
place.  And this existence, having an identity, is just a convention.  It's a practical matter, 1046 




R:  No, I believe that human beings have an identity, yes, in some informal sense.  If you 1049 
next ask me what it means to have an identity, I will be unable to say anything 1050 
intelligible. 1051 
 1052 
M:  How about this... Do you think of yourself as basically rational or basically 1053 
irrational? 1054 
 1055 
R:  Well, most of human behavior is irrational, but there's a rational component.   1056 
 1057 
M:  So there's really kind of a balance, I guess. 1058 
 1059 
R:  Well, it's not a balance.  There's nothing rational about, let us say, how you manage to 1060 
breathe or send blood to your cells.  Most parts of the brain have no contact with what we 1061 
think of as the conscious mind.  And all those parts are necessarily nonrational. And, of 1062 
course, there are components of emotional life that are irrational as well.   1063 
 1064 
M:  If we're not already off the deep end, I'm going to ask you a question that maybe will 1065 
sound silly and maybe it will not, but...have you ever experienced any kind of 1066 
communion with the infinite or universal consciousness or something transcendental or 1067 




R:  No, I'm really the extreme of non-spirituality.  I wouldn't have been against having 1070 
such an experience, but I never had one. 1071 
 1072 
M:  Well, that gets back to—and we can wrap this up with this—there was one statement 1073 
in the questionnaire and you were asked whether you agreed or disagreed with it... The 1074 
statement was, "Although I do not believe in God, I am open-minded about the mysteries 1075 
of life."  And then you said that you strongly disagreed.  I'm wondering is that because 1076 
the word "mysteries" suggested something supernatural or something like that, and that 1077 
you disagreed with that maybe? 1078 
 1079 
R:  Right.  Of course, I believe that a great deal is knowable eventually by science.  But 1080 
the mysteries of life as a spiritual plane, I don't respond to.  Alas!  Alas! 1081 
 1082 
M:  I don't know how to follow up with any other questions.  It's a conundrum, I guess.  If 1083 
you had anything to add, I would be glad to hear it.  I would be more than glad.   1084 
 1085 
R:  Well, go on with your good work.  It's been a pleasure talking to you.   1086 
 1087 
M:  Thank you.  You, too. 1088 
 1089 
R:  If something interesting comes out that you want to share with the world, I would be 1090 




M:  Thank you.  Hopefully maybe something interesting will come out of this and I will 1093 
let you know. 1094 
 1095 
R:  Okie-doke. 1096 
 1097 
M:  I appreciate it so much. 1098 
 1099 
R:  Bye-bye. 1100 
 1101 
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On the afternoon of July 15, 1969, Matthew William Pappas was plucked out of 
his mother’s womb only about a hundred yards away from the University of Texas, one 
of his future alma maters.  His parents, William Theodore Pappas and Charlotte Elizabeth 
Pappas, had previously had three other children.  Apparently satisfied that they had 
finally gotten the child they wanted in Matthew, they had no more children.   
Matthew’s entire formal education occurred in the state of Texas.  He graduated 
from Alamo Heights High School in San Antonio, Austin College in Sherman, and The 
University of Texas at Austin.  At some point during the 1990s, Matthew was officially 
recognized as a member of the National Barbecue Association; he had eaten so much 
barbecue at so many different barbecue restaurants in central Texas that friends and 
associates would seek advice about barbecue from Matthew.  His education about 
barbecue was informal and not nearly as costly as his figurative matriculation in the 
“school of hard knocks” that continues to this day. 
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